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UNCHARTERED TERRITORY: MARKET COMPETITION'S 




I. INTRODUCTION 1 
* David Groshoff is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Providence College's School of 
Business and begins his appointment as an Assistant Professor of Law at Western 
State University's College of Law in August 2010. 
I profoundly thank Dr. Katherine K. Merseth of the Harvard Graduate School of 
Education and Dr. Effendi Leonard of M.I.T. for their unyielding assistance and 
support. Also, I am grateful to Dr. Vicki Jacobs, Joshua Beauregard, Andres Castro 
Samayoa, Susan Kandel, and Dr. Meira Levinson of Harvard University, as well as to 
Professor David S. Cohen of Drexel University's Earle Mack School of Law and Dr. 
Cornelius Riordan of Providence College. I owe a debt of gratitude to Bruce Johanssen, 
Richard Ream, Robert Kuykendall, Bret Michael Sychak, Ralph Saenz, Darren Leader, 
Russ Parrish, and Travis Haley. All erroneous statements and assertions are solely my 
own. 
1. The following definitions explain the terms used in this article. First, "status-
conscious," "status-identifiable," "single-sex," and "sex-segregated," include some of the 
terms that legal scholars have used to identify schooling that separates students based 
on sex. See, C.f?., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pra{?matic Understanding of Status-
Consciousness: The Case of Dere{?ulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753 (2000); David S. 
Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist Myth of 
Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135 (2009); Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational 
Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
451 (1999). Unless quoting third parties, I use the term "sex-segregated" to describe 
this type of education. 
Second, despite Justice Ginsburg's desire to use "the term 'gender discrimination' as a 
synonym for 'sex discrimination,'" Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of 
Foreign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14, the 
terms "gender'' and "sex" are distinguishable in practice, and the legal community 
should be hesitant to equate these terms. See, e.g., Patience W. Crozier, Forcing Boys to 
Be Boys: The Persecution of Gender Non-Conforming Youth, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
123, 125-26 (2001) ("Sex refers to whether a person is male or female based largely on 
anatomical factors such as external genitalia. Gender refers to the characteristics 
associated with masculinity and femininity." (quoting CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE 
WAR AGAINST BOYS (Simon & Schuster 2000)) (citations omitted)); see also Anna I. 
Corwin, Language and Gender Variance: Constructing Gender Beyond the 
Male I Female Binary, 12 ELECT. J. HUM. SEXUALITY (2009), available at 
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"The concept of a charter school is based on the free-market 
theories of the [1976 Nobel Prize winning] libertarian 
economist Milton Friedman, who asserted that providing 
parents with a choice would result in an overall improvement 
in the school system."2 After winning an election campaign in 
http://www.ejhs.orgNolume12/Gender.htm (indicating that the meaning of gender is 
broader than that of sex). I therefore consider solely the legal question of charter 
schools segregating students born with - and continuing to possess - male or female 
genitalia, and I assume that the broader gender-relevant legal implications involved 
with intersex, transsexual, transgender, and genderqueer individuals are beyond the 
scope of this Article. Thus, to reflect the specific analysis appropriately, I use the term 
"sex," rather than Justice Ginsburg's preferred but more confused use of "gender." 
Third, for the definition of "charter school," see infra Part II.B.l. Depending on context, 
I use "charter" and "charter school" interchangeably. 
Fourth, "public" in the context of public education is amorphous ("In a world where 
charter schooling ... and other recent developments no longer fit neatly into our 
conventional mental boxes .... [t]he 'publicness' of a school does not depend on class 
size, the use of certified teachers, rules governing employee termination. or the rest of 
the procedural apparatus that ensnares traditional district schools." Frederick M. 
Hess, What is a ''Public School?" Principles for a New Century, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 1, 
1, 14 (2004)). Massachusetts Secretary of Education Paul Reville recently asserted that 
public schools have traditionally been "large-scale, highly bureaucratic, monopolistic" 
institutions; I use the term "traditional public" to refer to these schools. KATHERINE K. 
MERSETH, INSIDE URBAN CHARTER SCHOOLS: PROMISING PRACTICES A~D STRATEGIES IN 
FIVE HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOLS x (Harvard Education Press 2009). Because charters 
are materially government financed, see infra Part II.B.1, charters are "public schools." 
I therefore discuss two flavors of K-12 public schools in this Article: traditional public 
and charters. While other schools, including religious, parochial, and independent 
schools, may receive limited federal funding, see infra Part III, or state funding via 
vouchers, see infra Part IV.E, I define a "private" school as one that receives a 
substantial majority of its funding from non-government sources. 
Fifth, "sex-segregated charters" signifies charters whose activities are entirely sex-
segregated. As of July 2009, nearly twenty percent of publicly funded sex-segregated 
education in the U.S. is sex-segregated according to this definition. Nat'! Assoc. for 
Single Sex Pub. Educ., http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-schools.htm (last visited 
July 7, 2009) ("NASSPE") (indicating that "at least 91 of the 540 public schools 
[offering some type of sex-segregated education] ... qualify as single-sex schools, 
meaning that students attending any of those schools have all their school activities -
including lunch and all electives- in a setting which is all-boys or all-girls."). 
2. CHARTER SCH. INST., STATE UN!V. OF N.Y., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS, 2.2 (2008) 
http://www.newyorkcharters.org/documents/generalFAQ12-4-07cov.doc (last visited 
March 26, 2010). The Charter Schools Institute (SUNY) functions as one of three types 
of entities created by New York to authorize and oversee charters. The other two are 
the New York State Board of Regents and certain local boards of education, including 
New York City and Buffalo. Milton Friedman supported a neoclassical economic 
philosophy that opposed the then-dominant Keynesian economic model (which asserted 
that government, rather than free and rationally acting market participants, should 
direct the allocation of resources and capital); see, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH 
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 128-
29 (Simon & Schuster 2002) (1998). Relating Friedman's philosophy to school choice, 
"[t]he most authoritative proponents of 'educational choice' have relied on the language 
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which his opponents labeled his policies socialistic, 3 while at 
the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce ("USHCC") President 
Barack Obama embraced the market-based school choice 
attributed to Friedman and "call[ed] on states to reform their 
charter rules and lift caps on the number of allowable charter 
schools, wherever such caps are in place."4 Four broad reasons 
support why the President chose to highlight charter market 
expansion at the USHCC. First, Latinos constitute a significant 
and growing population in urban education. 5 Second, 
traditional urban public schools historically have been inferior 
to non-urban public schools.6 Third, many policymakers have 
advocated charters as potential solutions to the specific 
problems facing urban public education. 7 Fourth, chambers of 
of economics to account and argue for this shift in policy direction, suggesting that 
competitive markets ensure that service providers will be more innovative, responsive, 
and efficient than government 'monopolies."' .Jeffrey R. Henig et a!., Does Mission 
Matter, in A GUlllE TO CHARTER SCHOOLS, RESEARCH AND ADVICE FOR EDUCATORS 130 
(Myron S. Kayes & Robert Maranto eds., Rowman & Littlefield Education 1992) 
(citations omitted). Nobel Pri;-;e winning economist Gary Becker indicated that 
Friedman's intellectual contributions allowed one to "apply economic analysis to an 
array of social issues," and "take markets, rationality and incentives and illuminate 
issues involving race, education, and the family." YERCIN & STANISLAW at 129. 
3. See ABC News Political Radar Blog, Palin Invokes Socialism Charge Against 
Obama, Oct. 20, 2008, http:l/blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/10/palin-invokes-
s.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (stating, "Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin continued the 
Republican ticket's attempt to tie Sen. Barack Obama to what it calls socialist 
economic policie,; ... . ");see also Klaus Marre, Obama Ridicules Socialism Charge, THE 
HILL, Oct. 29, 2008, http://thehill.com/campaign-2008/obama-ridicules-socialism-
charge-2008-10-29.html (last visited Jul. 5, 2009). 
4. See Transcript of Comments, Obama's Remarks on Education, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://blogs. wsj.com/wash wire/2009/03/1 0/obamas-remarks-on -education-2/ (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2010). 
5. See, e.g., Edgar G. Epps, Race and School Desegregation: Contemporary Legal 
and Educational Issues 1 U. PENN. GSE URBAN ED. J. Article 3 (2002) (asserting that 
"Latino students will soon become the largest non-European racial/ethnic group in the 
public schools, and like African Americans, they tend to be urban dwellers and 
disproportionately from lower income families.") (references omitted); see also Min 
Zhou, Urban Education: Challenges in Educating Culturally Diverse Children, 105 
TEACHERS COL. RECORDS 208 (2003). 
6. See, e.g, JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: HOW SCHOOLS STRUCTURE 
INEQUALITY 1-39, 261-285 (Yale University Press 2d ed. 2005) (1985);, JONATHAN 
KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN 
AMERICA 1-62 (Crown Publishers 2005). 
7. See, e.g., Katherine Santiago, U.S. Education Secretary to Visit Newark 
Charter School North Star Academy, THE STAR-LEDGER, Jun. 5, 2009 (stating that "[i]n 
New Jersey, as in many states, they [charters] have focused on the most troubled 
urban neighborhoods, and some have shown great successes."), available at 
http://www .nj .com/news/index.ssf/2009/06/us_education_secretary _to_ visi.html; see also 
an example of a charter law favoring urban areas, infra note 21. 
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commerce tend to support market-based solutions. While some 
people may interpret President Obama's statement to mean 
that charter rules have not been reformed recently, the U.S. 
Department of Education ("DOE") materially modified its rules 
and regulations affecting charters in 2006,8 and some states 
also encouraged meaningful charter innovation in the past 
several years.9 Within his first hundred days after taking 
office, President Obama executed federal incentives persuading 
states to develop their charter markets further, 10 and the 
Senate confirmed Arne Duncan, a supporter of public school 
innovation that included sex-segregated public schooling, as 
Secretary of Education. 11 These recent events have made rules 
and regulations more accommodating for charter market 
expansion and innovation, including for charters that 
exclusively admit a single sex of students. 12 
Despite a political environment that appears to support the 
creation of sex-segregated charters, the judicial backdrop 
affecting them is far more opaque. Only once has the U.S. 
8. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62531, 62535, 62540-41 (Oct. 25, 
2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) [hereinafter 2006' DOE Regulations]. 
9. For example, in 2008, Delaware amended its charter laws to permit sex-
segregated education. See infra note 45. 
10. See, e.g., Gintautas Dumicus, Menino Makes Pitch for More Charter Schools, 
DORCHESTEH REPORTEH, July 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.dotnews.com/2009/menino-makes-pitch-more-charter-schools (stating that 
Boston Teachers Union President Richard Stutman accused Boston Mayor Thomas 
Menino of changing his position to favor charters in part due to "the federal 
government's dangling of $5 billion in incentives for loosening charter school 
regulations.");see also H.R. Con. Res. 1, lll'h Cong. (2009) (enacted) [hereinafter 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act]. 
11. Obama Taps Arne Duncan for Secretary of ED [sic], ~<:SCHOOLNEWS, Dec. Hi, 
2008, http://www .eschoolnews.com/2008/12/16/obama-taps-arne-duncan-for-secretary-
of-ed/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (stating that as CEO of Chicago's Public Schools, 
Duncan ... discussed the launch of several non-traditional ... schools. including . 
. . single-sex ... schools. Bringing specialized schools to Chicago, Duncan said, 
would cater to students' varied abilities and interests . . [W]e know that not 
every child learns the same way ... [s]ome children learn better in a classroom 
surrounded by all boys or all girls.). 
See also, Editorial, Arne Duncan: A Reformer as U.S. Education Secretary. SEATTLE 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2008532391_edit18educa.html 
(describing Duncan as an urban public school superintendent who historically 
supported charters). 
12. Over the past fifteen years, educational entrepreneurs created approximately 
3,000 new charters. See U.S. Charter Schools, About the Charter School Movement, 
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs_docs/o/movement.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 
2009); see also Delaware's 2008 changes, infra note 45. 
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Supreme Court decided a case that classified primary and 
secondary ("K-12") public school students based on sex, and 
that ruling was made by an equally divided Court, without any 
published opinion. 13 The district court in that case indicated 
that analyzing sex-based classifications in K-12 public schools 
was a new and "unchartered territory." 14 Since that time, 
however, not only has the Court failed to rule on sex-based 
classifications in K-12 public schools in general, but it also has 
provided convoluted guidance on K-12 market-based choice 
schools and K-12 school segregation15 that otherwise could 
have been helpful in creating and assessmg the 
constitutionality of sex-segregated charters. 
Due to the recent growth in sex-segregated charters, the 
welcoming political landscape that currently encourages their 
creation, and the lack of direction by the Supreme Court, this 
Article explores what happens when market competition and 
choice - generally regarded as innocuous principles supported 
by many individuals across the U.S. political spectrum16 - are 
(a) applied to education, (b) combined with empirical evidence 
of charter success in educating urban students, and (c) mixed 
with policy arguments that form the basis of sex-segregated 
charters. 17 By attempting to navigate the scant potentially 
relevant guidance from the Court, the Article analyzes how 
sex-segregated charters, including those expressly authorized 
13. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). 
14. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 400 F. Supp. 326, 335 (E.D. Pa. 
1975), reu'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 
703 (1977). 
15. Despite turnover among the Court's members, including its Chief Justice, the 
Court's two most recent cases involving the constitutionality of K·12 school choice 
programs and segregation were both 5-4 decisions in which the justices issued an 
unusually high six opinions per case. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see 
discussion infra Part IV.E-F. 
16. See, e.g., GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER NELSON, WHAT'S PUBLIC ABOUT 
CHARTER SCHOOLS? LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT CHOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (Corwin 
Press 2002) (stating that charters are supported by both liberals and conservatives, 
and asserting that because ''the charter concept is so politically ambidextrous [it] has 
contributed, no doubt, to the movement's impressive growth over the past decade."); see 
also Sharpton, Gingrich, Duncan Team Up on School Reform, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 
2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-08-14-sharpton-gingrich_N.htm?csp=34 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2009) (indicating that former Republican Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Newt Gingrich "applauded Obama for showing 'real courage on the 
issue of charter schools."'). 
17. See infra Part V.A. 
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by state legislatures, may comport with Title IX of the Patsy 
Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act 1 x and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 19 The Article 
concludes that despite the ostensibly benevolent goals of the 
educational entrepreneurs that create charters, many sex-
segregated charters violate the law. 
Part II provides a general history of the educational 
inequality and market-based theories that helped lead to the 
public school reform movement and the creation of charters, 
particularly in urban areas. This Part articulates what 
constitutes a charter and provides examples of various flavors 
of innovative charters and charter-enabling legislation, 
including laws sanctioning sex-segregated charters. I argue 
that successful charters prosper not only due to market 
mechanisms but also because of stakeholder20 buy-in and the 
implementation of recognized organizational structure theory. 
This Part also asserts that because charters often have been 
created to benefit urban students21 who have historically been 
subjected to inferior public education in the U.S.,22 expanded 
18. 20 U.S. C. § 1681 (2009) [hereinafter Title IX]. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
20. No generally accepted definition exists for public education stakeholders. 
Stacey M. Childress and Allen S. Grossman of Harvard Business School stated that 
stakeholders were "people and groups inside and outside the organization who have a 
legitimate interest in the system and can influence the effectiveness of the strategy. 
These include teachers, principals and their unions, parents, school boards, community 
and advocacy groups, and local politicians and policymakers, among others." Mallory 
Stark, Public Education Goes to School, HARV. Bus. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE. (Dec. 
19, 2005). The Texas Public Education Information Resource indicated that 
stakeholders in public education included "administrators, educators, state leadership, 
researchers, and professional organizations .... " Texas P-16 Public Education 
Information Resource, http://www.texaseducationinfo.org/tpeir/ (last visited Aug. 3, 
2009). The title of Edie L. Holcomb's book argues for another meaning-ful stakeholder 
in public education: STUDENTS ARE STAKEHOLDERS, TOO!: lNCLUOING EVERY VOICF: IN 
AUTHENTIC HIGH SCHOOL REFORM (Corwin Press 2007). 
21. See, e.g., Missouri's requirement that "[c]harter schools may be operated only 
in a metropolitan school district or in an urban school district containing most or all of 
a city with a population greater than three hundred fifty thousand inhabitants .... ". 
MO. REV. STAT.§ 160.400.2 (2008). 
22. See generally Beth C. Rubin, eta!., Structuring Inequality at Berheley High, in 
UNFINISHED BL"SINESS: CLOSING THF: RACIAL ACHIEVF:MENT GAP IN OUR SCHOOLS 29-86 
(Pedro Noguera & Jean Yonemura Wing, eds., .Jossey-Bass Puhlishler 2006); KOZOL, 
supra note 6; PEDRO NOGUF:RA, CITY SCHOOLS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 82-102 
(Teachers College Press 2003); Dorothy Shipps, The Bu.,inessman's Edncator: Mayoral 
Takeover and Nontraditional Leadership in Chicago, in PoWERFUL REFORMS WITH 
SHALLOW ROOTS: IMPROVING AMERICA'S URilAN SCHOOLS 16-37 (Larry Cuban & 
Michael Usdan, eds., Teachers College Press 200.'3) (asserting that urban and minority 
students overwhelmingly have received inferior public educations to students at non-
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charter innovation may help shrink the achievement gap that 
exists in urban public education.23 As a result, charter caps 
arguably deny access to a better education for hundreds of 
thousands of mostly urban students24 - the students with the 
least relative social capital25 to spend in an educational 
marketplace. I maintain that while de jure charter caps may 
not be the pressing hobgoblin that some people assert, 
legislators and entrepreneurs should continue expanding the 
number of charters into a larger and less illiquid market, 
creating a more efficient public school landscape. 
Part III considers Title IX as it applies to schools that 
admit and administer education solely to students of a specific 
sex to the exclusion of the other sex. A combination of the latest 
re-authorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act26 (currently known as the "No Child Left Behind Act"27 
("NCLB")) and the 2006 DOE Regulations encouraged the 
development of sex-segregated charters and raised questions 
about these schools' constitutionality. Based on legislative and 
judicial history, this Part addresses the viability of sex-
segregated charters under Title IX. 
Part IV discusses the judicial underpinnings that 
potentially relate to sex-segregated charters. Here, I review the 
development of the intermediate level of scrutiny that courts 
apply to sex-based government classifications as well as the 
heightened tests that courts use in the context of public 
education. I argue that while charters are schools of choice, the 
Court's recent private choice doctrine is irrelevant to charters; 
the Court's guidance in K-12 racial segregation, however, may 
help to frame part of an understandable analytic for the 
urban public schools). 
23. While I use the term "achievement gap," Gloria Ladson-Billings instead refers 
to an "education debt" that "comprises historical, economic, sociopolitical, and moral 
components" that are analogous "with the concept of national debt." Gloria Ladson-
Billings, From the Achievement Gap to the Education Debt: Understanding Achievement 
in U.S. Schools, 35 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3 (2006). 
24. See, Editorial, Blachboard Pulpit, Encouraging the Spread of Charter Schools, 
WASH. POST, Jun. 22,2009 at A14 (stating that "[a]n estimated 365,000 students are on 
waiting lists to get into charter schools."). 
25. See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 
Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to 
the Analysis of Social Structure, 94 AM. J. Soc. 895 (1988). 
26. 20 U.S.C. § 3.381 (1965) [hereinafter ESEA]. The ESEA was originally 
authori;;;ed until 1970 but has been reauthorized to the present in various forms. 
27. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001). 
314 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2010 
constitutionality of sex-segregated charters. 
Because so many variations of charters and charter laws 
exist, examining more than one of them is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Part V investigates one example of the 
constitutionality of sex-segregated charters in an application 
approved by New York in June 2009. New York provides a 
compelling study because its legislature authorized the 
creation of sex-segregated charters, sex-segregated charters 
currently operate there, and the state is transparent in its 
objectives and interests for approving and funding sex-
segregated charters. This Part applies the Court's potentially 
applicable tests to this charter application approval and 
evaluates whether any of the Court's safe harbors for sex-based 
government classifications may be relevant to the charter 
application. 
The Article closes by recognizing that market mechanisms, 
organizational architectures, and stakeholder buy-in are the 
three essential features of charter success. It acknowledges 
that charters can be valuable tools in the struggle to improve 
urban public education. But while strong policy arguments and 
substantiated results favor continued charter evolution, 
insufficient evidence exists for many sex-segregated charters, 
as currently constituted, to pass legal scrutiny. I conclude that 
the three essential characteristics of charters - not sex-
segregation - are what make a measurable difference in 
improved student achievement. As a result, no exceedingly 
persuasive justification exists for states to maintain most sex-
segregated charters. To have any meaningful chance of 
surviving Title IX and Equal Protection Clause challenges, sex-
segregated charter legislation, applications, and charter 
documents must employ specific language that the Court has 
indicated may survive constitutional scrutiny. Using such 
precise diction in hopes of passing judicial review, however, 
would likely force the proponents of sex-segregated charters to 
change the vision and practice of the schools that they wish to 
create. But without the de facto implementation of such 
wording, sex-segregated charters likely violate Title IX and the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
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II. EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT CHARTERS BUT 
WERE AFRAID TO ASK 
A. How Were Charters Born? 
The origins of educational reform that led to today's school 
choice trace back to the works of Gunnar Myrdal and Milton 
Friedman, two influential economists holding diametrically 
opposing views.28 First, the 1944 publication of Gunnar 
Myrdal's poignant report, An American Dilemma: The Negro 
Problem and Modern Democracy,29 led to its ultimate citation 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1954 germinal desegregation 
case, Brown v. Board of Education.30 The year following Brown, 
Milton Friedman advocated the concept of public school choice 
and asserted that breaking the monopoly of the traditional 
public schools and providing parents with options would lead to 
an improvement in a failing traditional public school system. 31 
Despite Friedman's arguments, states did not implement 
public school choice, and 1966's "Coleman Report"32 and 1983's 
A Nation at Risk33 continued to evidence a broken traditional 
public education system. A 1990 Brookings Review article 
entitled America's Public Schools: Choice Is a Panacea became 
one of the final prominent manifestos prior to the advent of 
charters.34 Panacea predicted that increased spending and 
other school experiments were "destined to fail" because, first, 
28. See Samuel Brittan, The Not So Noble Nobel Prize, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2003, (asserting that structural development economist Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel Prize 
recipient, advocated the abolition of the Nobel Prize in economics because the prize had 
also been awarded to neoclassical libertarian economists such as Friderich von Hayek 
and Milton Friedman). 
29. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGHO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (Transaction Publishers 1995) (1944). 
30. 347 U.S. 483, n.ll (1954) [hereinafter Brown]. 
31. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., Trustees of Rutgers College 1955). 
While Friedman's specific idea in this text was aimed at choice through vouchers, as 
noted by the Charter School Institute supra note 2, charters are a direct descendant of 
Friedman's market-based ideas. 
::!2. ,James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE 3 (1966). 
33. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE 
FO!{ EDUCATIONAL REFORM: A REPORT TO THE NA'l'ION AND THE SECRETARY OF 
EDUCATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (1983). 
34. John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, America's Public Schools: Choice lfi a 
Panacea, 8 BROOKINGS REV. 4-12 (1990) [hereinafter Panacea]. 
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institutional reform needed to unleash markets, and then only 
after markets existed would parental choice within these 
markets lead to greater student achievement.35 Panacea 
argued "how much students learn is not determined simply by 
their aptitude or family background . . . but also by how 
effectively schools are organized."36 
Making the case for educational choice and competition, 
Panacea asserted that 
through democratic control and markets ... American society 
makes most of its choices on matters of public importance, 
including education. Public schools are subject to direct 
control through politics. But not all schools are controlled in 
this way. Private schools - representing about a fourth of all 
schools are subject to indirect control through markets. 
What difference does it make? Our analysis suggests that the 
difference is considerable. Schools compete for the support of 
parents and students, and parents and students are free to 
choose among schools. The system is built on decentralization, 
competition, and choice." 
[B]ureaucratic control ... [is] simply unnecessary for schools 
whose primary concern is to please their clients. 37 
In other words, schools in a market based on choice and 
competition would be incentivized to become the "organizations 
that academics and reformers would [otherwise] like to impose 
on the public schools."38 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 6. 
38. Id. at 5. The educational choice theory was revisited again in 2002, essentially 
a decade after the birth of charters, and was recaptured in the milieu of charters as 
follows: 
According to the theory, choice improves schools through two distinct mechanisms. 
The first is through competition. Most charter schools receive the lion's share of 
their funding through ... allocations that travel with pupils. If a student chooses 
to attend a charter school, that school receives a fixed-sum payment [directly from 
the government]. As a consequence, schools that fail to attract and retain students 
will, in theory, go out of business. Since charter schools cannot gain a leg up on 
competitors by lowering their "prices," they must compete primarily on quality. 
Thus, the charter concept postulates that, other things equal, competition for 
students will raise the quality of charter schools and that schools failing to 
compete on quality will be forced to close. 
Second, choice also works through a sorting process. Where there is a wide variety 
of schools from which to choose, and where each provides a different mix of 
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After this nearly fifty-year narrative provided by academic 
research, policy studies, and theorizing, came a counter 
narrative from influential urban youths within popular culture 
who screamed for positive change in public education. Perhaps 
representing a more modern and widely accepted 
representation of James Baldwin's rage,39 this saga was 
articulated by Grammy Award winning artists Rage Against 
the Machine, whose angst at the failure of the monopolistic 
traditional public education system extant at the time 
produced a rage that was 
relentless/We need a movement with a quickness .... The 
present curriculum/! put my fist in 'em/Eurocentric every last 
one of 'em . . . . With lecture I puncture the structure of 
lies .... One-sided stories for years and years and years .... 
[W]e need to check the interior/Of the system that cares about 
only one culture/And that is why/We gotta take the power 
back .... The teacher stands in front of the class/But the 
lesson plan he can't recall/The student's eyes don't perceive 
the lies/Bouncing off every ... wall .... Europe ain't my rope 
to swing on/Can't learn a thing from itN et we hang from 
it .... Gotta .... [e]xpose and close the doors on those who 
try/To strangle and mangle the truth .... 40 
Using the words and media of popular culture, Rage 
identified to a broad audience the inequitable power, failed 
organizational structure, poor pedagogy, inability to shutter 
abhorrent schools, and factually erroneous41 and culturally 
services. customers will choose the mix of services that best meets their 
educational preferences ... Choice advocates also argue that the very act of choice 
will leave students, parents, and teachers disposed to work harder to support the 
schools they have chosen. 
MIIWN & NELSON, supra note 16, at 5 (references omitted). 
:39. Baldwin said: "To be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious is 
to b;; in a rage almost all the time," and "[e]ducation is indoctrination if you're white-
subjugation if you're black." Nation: Neuro Leaders on Violence, TIME, Aug. 20, 1965, 
auailablc at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,841950,00.html; see 
also About.com: Mrica-American History, James Baldwin Quotes, 
http://afroamhistory.about.com/ocl/jamesbaldwin/a/quotes_baldwin.htm (last visited 
Aug. :3, 2009) .• James Baldwin has a traditional public school named after him in New 
York City that is forty-four percent black and forty-four percent Latino with 2008 test 
scores below both the district (Geographic District #2) and the state. See 
Education.com. 200H Test Scores, James Baldwin School, 
http://www.education.com/schoolfinder/us/new-york/new-york/james-baldwin-
school/test-results/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
40. RAm: AnAI:-IST THE MACHINE, Take the Power Bach, on RAGE AGAINST THE 
MACHINE (Sony Records 1992). 
41. For a discussion of some of the "one-sided stories," "lies," and factually 
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irrelevant curriculum.42 These defects not only were mentioned 
in the above studies, but they also constituted the reality for 
those individuals who lacked the social capital to choose the 
provision of their education. Because existing laws prohibited 
competition within public education, they perpetuated the 
failings of traditional urban public schools. Charters, which 
would permit concepts such as culturally relevant schools, 
could indeed become a "movement with a quickness" in which 
stakeholders could, in short order, create and attend public 
schools of their choice. Charters could enable these changes by 
employing market mechanisms to free legions of stakeholders 
from the failed traditional urban public schools and to shift the 
power, structure, curriculum, and pedagogy that continued to 
exist in traditional public schools in the early 1990s in a 
different direction. 
With these chronicles serving as the historical, theoretical, 
and emotional underpinnings that preceded meaningful public 
educational choice and competition, Minnesota, in 1991, 
became the first state to enact charter-enabling legislation.43 
California followed in 1992. Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Mexico, and Wisconsin enabled charters in 
1993, and three more states did so in 1994 (Arizona, Hawaii, 
Kansas). Eight states plus the District added charter 
legislation in 1995 (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Texas, Wyoming), six more 
states in 1996 (Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and 
North and South Carolina), four in 1997 (Mississippi, Nevada, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania), five in 1998 (Idaho, Missouri, New York, 
Utah, Virginia), two in 1999 (Oklahoma, Oregon), Indiana in 
2001, Iowa and Tennessee in 2002, and Maryland in 2003.44 In 
erroneous items that have long been a part of the traditional public education system, 
see, e.g., JAMES W. LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER TOLD ME: EVERYTHING YOUR AMERICAN 
HISTORY TEXTBOOK GOT WRONG (Touchstone Publishing 1996)); HOWARD ZINN. A 
PEOPLES' HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2005). 
42. See, e.g., Gloria Ladsen-Billings, But That's Just Good Teaching! The Case for 
Culturally Relevant Pedagogy, 34 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 159-65 (Sum. 1995). 
Culturally relevant schools are discussed in greater detail, infra Part II.B.2. 
43. See, e.g., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra 
note 2, at 1.1. 
44. See U.S. Charter Schools, State By State #'s, 
http://www.uscharterschools.org/cs/sp/query/q/1595?x-order=year,state (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2009). By process of elimination, the ten states that prohibit charters are: 
Maine, Vermont, West Virginia, Kentucky, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota. 
Nebraska, Alabama, and Washington. 
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little more than a decade, year after year, state after state, 
following generation after generation of studies, discussions, 
and emotions spurred by the failed monopoly of the traditional 
public schools, a massive and unprecedented movement had 
occurred in U.S. public education - in a vast majority of the 
country, public school choice through charters had become a 
reality. That reality became diverse, as legislatures took a 
variety of views on multiple types of charter innovation, 
including sex-segregated charters.45 
45. For example, New York, Ohio, and Delaware explicitly permit sex-segregated 
charters. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(2) (McKinney 2006) (stating that "nothing in this 
article shall be construed to prevent the establishment of a single-sex charter school."); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § .1314.06 (Anderson 2007) (stating that 
[t]he governing authority of each community school established under this chapter 
shall adopt admission procedures that specify the following: ... (D)(l) That there will 
be no discrimination in the admission of students ... except that 
[tjhe governing authority may establish single-gender schools ... provided 
comparable facilities and learning opportunities are offered for both boys and girls. 
Such comparable facilities and opportunities may be offered for each sex at 
separate locations). 
Delaware's recent legislative history may be instructive relative to a state's view of how 
the creation of sex-segregated charters comports with governing law. In March 2008, 
the Chair of Delaware's State Council of Persons with Disabilities provided a memo to 
the state's legislators regarding Delaware's proposed H.B. 285 concerning single-sex 
charters. See Memorandum from Ms. Deniese McMullin-Powell, Chairperson, State 
Council for Persons with Disabilities to All Members of the Delaware State Senate and 
House of Representatives (Mar. 14, 2008) (stating that in 2007 Delaware's Department 
of Education opined that single-sex charters could violate the law but the Chair 
supported amending state law to authorize single-sex charters). To assuage legal 
concerns, Delaware's HB 285 required, inter alia, the Delaware DOE to establish a sex-
segregated charter for the excluded sex within two years and sunset the sex-segregated 
school authorization in 2013. Delaware's legislation was proposed in response to an 
application to create the "Prestige Academy Charter School," an all-boys school. The 
next sex-segregated charter in Delaware must be "substantially equal" to the Prestige 
school. DEL. H.B. 285 (2008). In April 2008, Delaware Governor Ruth Ann Minner 
signed the legislation into law, thus authorizing single-sex charters in Delaware, and 
the Prestige school currently operates. See Single-Gender Charter Schools Bill Signed, 
DEL. NEWS ,J ., Apr. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20080422/NEWS03/804220406/Single-gender-
charter-school s-bill-signed 
Other states such as Arkansas, Arizona, and Colorado are legislatively silent on the 
issue. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14.03.250 (Michie 2002); AHIZ. REV. STAT., § 15-184 (2007); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-101 (2002). 
In contrast, Connecticut appears to frown upon sex-segregated charters. See CONN. 
GEN. STAT.§ 10-16p(f) (2007) (stating that charters are not to 
discriminate on th<' basis of race, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
religion, disability, athletic performance or proficiency in the English language, 
provided the school may limit enrollment to a particular grade level or specialized 
educational focus and, if there is not space available for all students seeking 
enrollment. the school may give preference to siblings but shall otherwise 
determine enrollment by a lottery). 
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B. So Charters May Exist, but Just What Are They? 
A charter school is so-called because a charter document 
functions as a contract between the state and the school; the 
charter document provides a description of the educational 
mission and responsibilities of the newly created publicly 
financed charter school.46 The principal investigator of 
Harvard's Charter Schools Chartering Practice Project, 
Katherine K. Merseth, indicated that 
[C]harter schools ... are similar to traditional public schools 
in several regards: they receive government funds to operate, 
they may not engage in religious instruction, and they are 
open to all interested students. These schools are state-level 
entities created by state legislatures and therefore subject to 
state level performance requirements, state curricular 
frameworks, and the federal requirements outlined under 
NCLB.47 
1. What Are Charters' Structural Features? 
Gary Miron and Christopher Nelson noted that the charter 
school model contains "a set of policy changes . . . that alter 
the ... environment in which charter schools operate. We call 
these 'structural' changes because they seek to fundamentally 
alter the conditions under which schools operate."4R The 
organization is "built on decentralization, competition, and 
choice."49 Charters thus created structural change and 
provided options through competitive market mechanisms to 
public education stakeholders that previously lacked the social 
capital to exercise educational choice. 
In terms of who may apply for a charter grant, charters 
distinguish themselves from traditional public schools because 
46. See FREQUEC\ITLY AsKED QUESTIOC\IS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra note 2, 
at 1.1. 
47. MERSETH supra note 1, at 3. See also Jim Stergios, Editorial, Gou. Behind the 
Curve, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 30, 2009 (stating that a "Boston Foundation report 
show[ed] that the city's charters, which significantly outperform district and pilot 
schools and educate a higher percentage of African-Americans than district schools, are 
bridging the achievement gap," and referencing THE BOSTON FOUC\IDATION, lC\IFORMJN(; 
THE DEBATE: COMPARING BOSTON'S CHARTER, PILOT, AND TRADITIONAL SCHOOLS (,Jan. 
2009), which was researched and prepared by faculty from Duke University, MIT, 
Harvard, and the University of Michigan). 
48. MIRON AND NELSON, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
49. Chubb and Moe, supra note 34, at 5. 
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often "a group of private individuals may open and govern a 
charter school, in contrast to traditional schools, which are 
typically governed by a publicly elected board or by individuals 
appointed by an elected official."50 If the schools fail to abide by 
their charter, or if they produce inappropriate results, the state 
can revoke a school's charter.51 Charters provide a swath of 
structural benefits that traditional public schools have not. 52 
Examples include, inter alia, longer school days,53 multi-aged 
classrooms, strict discipline policies, lower student/teacher 
ratios,54 summer programs, and more individualized student 
attention by teachers, tutors, and assistants.55 As a result, the 
structural differences that charters provide have not been -
and still are not - provided by the traditional urban public 
schools. 56 Charters generally have open enrollment and are not 
50. MERSETH, supra note 1, at 3. Because the actual composition of who may 
apply for a charter varies from state to state, the U.S. Charter Schools State 
Information website provides a tool to compare who may submit a charter application 
m any given state. See US Charter Schools State Information Page, 
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs~docs/splindex.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
51. See, e.g, Andrew Rother ham, The Pros & Cons of Charter School Closures, in 
HOPES, FEARS, & HEALITY, A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN 2005 
13-52 (Robin J. Lake & Paul T. Hill, eds., University of Washington, National Charter 
School Research Project 2005). 
52. For a detailed analysis of some of the structures and systems associated with 
successful charters and how those structures can be replicated, see MERSETH supra 
note 1, at 171-196 ("Structures and Systems, Getting Organized for Instruction"). 
53. See, e.f?., THOMAS DOWNES ET AL., INCOMPLETE GRADE: MASSACHUSETTS 
EDUCATION HE FORM AT 15 17 (Massinc. 2009). 
54. See, e.g., ARK. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS ~ FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS, (Jan. 2008), 
http://arkansased.org/schools/schools~chartecfaq~answers.html (last visited Aug. 3, 
2009) (discussing charters' increased emphasis on citizenship, ethics, and character 
education). Rut see OFFICE OF EDUC. HESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT, DEP'T OF EDUC., THE 
STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000: FOURTH-YEAR REPORT 17-26 (2000). 
55. For example, the MATCH Charter Public High School in Boston requires all 
students to attend two hours of daily tutoring, and newly admitted MATCH students 
"attend a summer academy each day for five hours, Monday through Thursday, for five 
consecutive weeks at ... MIT, for a total of one hundred hours." MERSETH, supra note 
1, at 93, 95, 105. 
56. Charter competition has, however, spurred some traditional public districts to 
lobby for changed laws that would permit traditional public school districts to have 
some greater structural flexibility. For example, the Boston Public Schools created the 
Boston Pilot Schools in 1995 "to promote increased choice options within the school 
district, largely in response to 1993 state legislation creating charter schools." MAss. 
DEP'T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., SCH. REDESIGN, available at 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/redesign/copilot/guidelines.html?section=all. Therefore, 
before any meaningful empirical studies could be issued on the efficacy of 
Massachusetts charters, the traditional public schools felt enough of a competitive 
threat by the mere presence of charters that it led to greater choice for Boston 
322 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2010 
subject to academic or language-based proficiencies. 57 If at 
capacity, students wanting to attend charters may be subject to 
lottery restraints or preferences for existing siblings at the 
school, "at-risk" students, and students living in the local 
neighborhood.58 Not surprisingly, given the grueling work and 
extensive hours required of faculty at some charters and the 
ability to terminate poor teachers quickly,59 teachers' unions 
have motives to oppose charters.60 
Charters are funded on per-pupil formulae, with the funds 
disbursed by the government directly to the charter or Local 
Education Agency (LEA).61 If a charter is its own LEA, then it 
may have "many more programmatic and financial 
responsibilities than a school that is only a part of an LEA."62 
The Center for Education Reform (CER) has indicated that an 
LEA is required to (1) receive federal education funds, (2) 
Assure delivery of acceptable services, (3) assure inclusion of 
all qualified students in funded programs, ( 4) provide training 
in compliance with federal laws and regulations, (5) conduct 
audits of federally funded programs ... [and] (6) report and 
stakeholders. 
57. But see lNFOJ{MJNG THE DEBATE, supra note 4 7, Table 4, at Hi (suggesting 
that a significantly smaller percentage of students who were Latino or who had limited 
English proficiency enrolled in charters or attempted to gain access to charters via a 
lottery). Anecdotal speculation suggests that dissemination of the charter option may 
have challenges crossing language barriers. As a result, the number of black students 
that enroll in charters may be disproportionately high, with the number of Latino 
students disproportionately low. Cf. David R. Garcia, Academic and Racial Segregation 
in Charter Schools: Do Parents Sort Students into Specialized Charter Schools? 40 
EDUC. & URBAN Soc. 590 (2008) (suggesting that some parents have chosen to leave 
more racially integrated district schools to attend more racially segregated charters). 
58. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 10-66, supra note 45. 
59. See PowerPoint: The National Charter School Research Project, University of 
Washington's Center on Reinventing Public Education & The Massachusetts Charter 
School Dissemination & Replication Project, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 
Human Resources & Charter Schools: Hiring, Turnover, & Retention in 7 States, at 
Slide 5 (2008) (indicating that charters in Arizona, Texas, California, Rhode Island, 
Hawaii, and Massachusetts generally have expanded pools of employee candidates, 
offer a match to compelling missions, provide incentive-based compensation, and 
dismiss employees for poor performance). 
60. See Letter from Dennis Van Roeckel, President, Nat'! Educ. Assoc. et al., to 
Arne Duncan, Secretary of Education (Aug. 21, 2009). 
61. See e.g., ROBIN JACOBOWITZ & JONATHAN S. GYURKO, CHA!n'Ell SCH. FUND!Nl; 
IN N.Y.: PERSPECTIVES ON PARITY WITH TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS, (Mar. 2004). 
62. See Primers on Implementing Special Education in Charter Schools, 
http://www.uscharterschools.org/cs/spedp/view/sped_aud/4?section=stat (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2009). 
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respond to state and federal Education Units."63 Whether a 
charter is an LEA is state-dependent. In Massachusetts, for 
example, a charter is treated as its own school district or LEA 
and maintains its own board.64 Colorado, however, defines a 
charter as a "public, nonsectarian, nonreligious, non-home-
based school which operates within a public school district."65 A 
Colorado charter is, therefore, a public school in the district 
that grants the charter and is "part of the school district that 
approves its charter application and charter contract and ... 
accountable to the local board of education pursuant to section 
22-30.5-104 (2)."66 Thus, Colorado charters do not serve as 
distinct LEAs, they operate within an existing school district, 
and they answer to that district's school board.67 Further 
muddying the issue, states such as New York allow charters to 
be considered either as LEAs or as part of the broader district, 
depending upon their creation and purpose. 68 Under many 
federal guidelines, each LEA has certain obligations. In the 
twenty-five states where a charter may constitute its own LEA, 
the CER "believes charters should be their own LEAs," 
allowing the charters to "receive federal funds directly,"69 
rather than having the funds pass "from the federal 
government to the state to the LEA, and finally to the charter 
school."70 Alternatively, "[i]n states where charters are not 
LEAs, the local district may keep a portion of the funding to 
cover administrative costs, and therefore, the charter school 
63. CTR. FOR EIJUC. REFORM, WHY CHARTER SCHOOLS SHOULD BE THEIR OWN 
INDEPENDENT LEA 2 ( 2008). 
64. See MASS. DEP'T OF ELEMENTAHY AND SECONDARY EDUC., MASSACHUSETTS 
PlUMER ON SPECIAL EDUCATION AND CHAI{'fER SCHOOLS, §II, Part II, A, 1 (2009). 
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-1 04(1) (2002) (emphasis added). 
66. Id. at 105-108(5). 
67. Having said this, Colorado charters are, however, ultimately administered by 
a governing body that is agreed to by both the charter applicant and the local school 
board. Id. at 104(4). 
68. Sec, e.g., Jacobowitz & Gyurko supra note 61 at n.1 (stating that charters are 
entitled to "one hundred percent" of the "expense per pupil," as defined by the Average 
Operating Expense/Total Allowable Pupil Units, but charters at times do not receive 
the entirety of the funds due to them). In addition, New York charters became their 
own LEA for NCLB purposes in 2001 hut are within a school district's LEA for 
purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). Id. at 3, Table 1; 
see also FHEQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS supra note 2 
(indicating that local districts can authorize charters in addition to the two state 
authorizing agencies). 
69. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 63. 
70. ld. 
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will receive less money."71 
2. Are Charters Successful, and, if so, Why? 
Research shows that charters can be successful relative to 
the traditional public schools. Several RAND studies published 
in 2009 suggest that charters had "some positive effect on high 
school student attainment"72 and that charter "high school 
students had a higher probability of graduating and attending 
college."73 Achievement gaps may be tightened by some high 
performing charters.74 As Merseth stated, "[w]hether one 
applies elements of systems theory, the advice of management 
gurus, or concepts of organizational congruence, a central 
element of high-performing organizations ... evident in these 
charter schools is the power of coherence."75 Charters function 
as places where entrepreneurs can create educational models 
based on business theory, and, if successful in the marketplace 
and in possession of a desire to do so, charters can become 
nationally recognized brands.76 Nineteen years following the 
arguments in Panacea, Merseth's and RAND's contemporary 
research appears to agree that organizational structures within 
educational markets can lead to heightened performance via 
successful charters.77 Simply put, established business doctrine 
and accepted economic theory78 support that an educational 
71. Id. at 3. 
72. Susan Bodilly, RAND EDUC., THE ROLE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS IN IMPROVINC 
EDUCATION (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RR9428/. 
73. Jennifer Li, RAND EDUC., ARE CHARTER SCHOOLS MAKING A DIFFERENCE? A 
STUDY OF STUDENT OUTCOMES IN EIGHT STATES 1 (2009), available at 
http://www .rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9433/ . 
7 4. See generally MERSETH supra note 1; INFORMINC THE DERATE, supra note 4 7. 
75. MERSETH, supra note 1, at 11. (referencing Deming (2000), Collins (2005), 
Drucker (1990), Tushman & O'Reilly (2002), and Nadler & Tushman (1980)). 
76. An example of a national charter brand is the KIPP brand, which is an 
acronym for "Knowledge Is Power Program." Two of KIPP's founders, Mike Feinberg 
and David Levin met in the Teach for America program in 1992 and created their own 
educational model that started in 1994 with a single classroom of 50 students. See, 
e.g., Stig Leschly, KIPP NATIONAL (A) (ABRIDGED) HARV. Bus. SCH. CASE 9-805-068, at 
1·4 (Jan. 13, 2005). As of July 2009, KIPP had 82 schools in 19 states plus the district, 
with approximately 20,000 students. See KIPP: Knowledge Is Power Program website, 
http://www.kipp.org/ (last visited July 18, 2009). 
77. Unlike the predictions in Panacea, however, Merseth appears to have argued 
that the micro, more than the macro, organization constitutes a proximate cause of 
successful urban charters. See MERSETH supra note 1; Panacea supra note 34. 
78. See, e.g., JAMES A. BRICKLEY ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & 
ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 280-505, 599-698 (McGraw-Hill Irwin 4th ed. 2007). 
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provider's organizational structure can lead to measurable 
differences in students' educational outcomes. 
Specific examples of market-based structural and 
organizational innovation among charters include schools 
whose curricula focus on the performing arts,79 business and 
finance, 80 math and science, 81 science and technology, 82 and the 
arts in general. 83 Other charters are more overtly cultural in 
their curricular missions. For example, the Academy of the 
Pacific Rim Charter Public School m Hyde Park, 
Massachusetts, focuses on fusing Asian and Western 
cultures.84 Other charters highlight American Indian culture,85 
while a number of charters are centered on African culture.86 
While culturally conscious in their missions, these schools do 
not restrict student admissions based on the school's particular 
cultural consciousness. If a parent would like his or her child to 
attend that charter, and if sufficient seats exist or, 
79. See, e.g., Sequoia Choice - Star Performing Arts Charter in Arizona 
http://sequoia.choiceed.org (last visited Mar. 26. 2010). 
HO. See, e.g, Pillar Academy of Business & Finance m Arizona, 
http://www.pillaracademy.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
Ill. See, e.g., Math and Science Success Academy m Arizona, 
http://www.amstucson.org/MASSA_info.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
82. Sec, e.g., Arizona Academy of Science and Technology, 
www.arizonaacademyofscience.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
8.3. Sec, e.g., Arizona School for the Arts, http://goasa.org/index.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2010). 
84. S('e Academy of the Pacific Rim, http://www.pacrim.org/our_story.htm (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2009). 
85. See, e.g., Brian Bielenberg, Charter Schools for American Indians, in LEARN 
IN BEAUTY: INDIGENOUS EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 132-151 (Jon Reyhner eta!. 
eels .. Northern Arizona University 2000). 
86. See, e.g., Roots Public Charter School in Washington, D.C., (stating that 
[t]he Mission of Roots Public Charter School is to: Promote and secure the 
connection of Mother Africa within our children; Prepare students to break the 
chains of psychological conditioning that attempt to keep them powerless in all 
phases of society: Provide students with a strong Mrican-centered learning 
environment: Guide students toward academic excellence, exemplary character 
and social responsibility; Encourage success leading to self-reliance and economic, 
social/political contributions to society.). 
Roots Public Charter School Mission and Philosophy, 
http://www .roots pes .org/School_ Philosophy_Mission/school_philosophy_mission. h t 
ml (last visited Aug. 3, 2009); the ,Joseph Littles-Nguzo Saba Charter School in West 
Palm Beach Florida (indicating that "[o]ur mission is to provide a nurturing and caring 
environment where at risk children can learn and be successful through a program of 
strong academics, high expectations, values and character building skills that are 
based on African culture and tradition"), Mission Statement, Joseph-Nguzo Saba 
Charter School, http://www.jlnscs.org/index.php (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
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alternatively, if that student wins a lottery,87 then that student 
may attend that school and learn based on the cultural 
missions of these schools, regardless of the student's cultural 
background.88 Having stakeholders, including students, buy 
into the schools' desire for stakeholder involvement is an 
essential element in erasing many of the tensions and failures 
that have plagued urban public education.89 Unlike traditional 
public schools, because charters are schools of choice, charters 
invite stakeholder buy-in. 
As a result, charter success appears to stem from three 
overarching factors: (1) a market that allows for choice and 
competition, (2) organizational structures that permit for 
coherence without bureaucracy, and (3) buy-in by stakeholders 
into a given charter's specific model, including a charter's 
specific curricular and pedagogical approach. These three 
reasons have tremendously affected student achievement, 
particularly with historically underachieving traditional urban 
public schools and their students. 
3. What Do Charter Caps Mean? 
Despite evidence of charter success, restrictions such as 
charter caps, which inhibit new charters from forming, 
arguably prevent a variety of potentially interested 
stakeholders from entering the educational marketplace. 90 As 
with all things charter, the rules limiting the number of 
charters in a given jurisdiction are a creation of state law, and 
their existence has become a contentious issue in recent years. 
In 2005, Christiansen and Lake asserted that the variation of 
the number of new charter schools "among the states can be 
explained by restrictive laws and caps,"91 and by 2009, sixty-
87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 10-66 (2007), supra note 45. 
88. For example, despite a mission to fuse Asian and Western cultures, the 
Academy of the Pacific Rim's student population is 57 percent black, 23 percent white, 
16 percent Latino and three percent Asian. MERSETH supra note 1, at 73. 
89. See, e.g., Jeff Duncan-Andrade, Gan{?stas, Wankstas, and Ridas: Defining, 
Developing, and Supporting Effective Teachers in Urban Schools, 20 INT'L J. OF 
QUALITATIVE STUD. TN EDUC., 617 (2007). See also GASTON ALONSO ET AL., OUR 
SCHOOLS SUCK: STUDENTS TALK BACK TO A SEGREGATED NATION ON THE FAILURES OF 
URBAN EDUCATION 71-112 (New York University Press 2009) (indicating generally that 
effective urban educators must get students to buy-into that educator's authenticity, 
some of which can be accomplished by having the educators openly accountable to 
students). 
90. See, e.g., DOWNES, supra note 5.'3. 
91. Jon Christensen & Robin J. Lake. The National Charter School Landscape in 
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five percent of the states that had charter-enabling legislation 
maintained artificial caps on the number of charters. 92 The 
National Charter School Research Project argued for lifting 
charter caps, asserting not only that room existed "for just 725 
more [charter] schools nationwide"93 but also that charter 
waiting lists in states such as New York were part of the 
nationwide problem that required charter caps to be lifted. 94 
These assertions are inaccurate, however. The first statement 
is logically impossible, given that a number of states, including 
Pennsylvania and Minnesota, have no charter caps. 95 As a 
result, room exists for countless more charters on a national 
basis. Moreover, the second assertion is flawed because New 
York has not yet hit its cap; in fact, the state authorized a new 
sex-segregated charter in June 2009 that is the subject of the 
below analysis in Part IV.A.96 
Regardless of whether the number of charters in an area is 
at or below a cap, de jure charter caps indeed exist, and they 
vary in number and rationale by state. For example, while New 
York's legislation limits the formation of new charters, an 
unlimited number of existing public schools may convert to 
charters. 97 In Arkansas, a similarly unlimited number of 
conversions may take place, but new KIPP schools98 are 
explicitly excluded from the cap on new charters, a provision 
unavailable to KIPP's competing educational entrepreneurs 
who thereby are restricted from creating new charters.99 
Beyond these de jure caps, some states arguably have de facto 
caps because the charter approval rests in the hands of the 
2007 in HOPES, FEARS, & REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS 
IN 2007 4 (Robin J. Lake ed., Nat'! Charter Sch. Res. Project, Ctr. on Reinventing Pub. 
Educ. 2007). 
92. Sec Editorial, Blachboard Pulpit: Encouraging the Spread of Charter Schools, 
WASH. POST, ,June 22, 2009. Even including the district in the equation as not having a 
charter cap, the figure remains over sixty-three percent. 
93. Christensen & Lake, supra note 91 at 1. 
94. See, e.g., National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, Caps on Charter 
Schools, http://www.publiccharters.org/node/45 (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
95. See, e.g., National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, Caps on Charter 
Schools, http://www.publiccharters.org/node/45 (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
96. See CHAHTER SCHOOLS INSTITUTE, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF N.Y., SUNY 
AUTHORIZED CHARTER SCHOOLS PEHCENT AT PROFICIENCY AS COMPARED TO THE 
DISTRICT (Jun. 12, 2009), infra Part V.A. 
97. N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 2852(9) (2006). 
98. See discussion of KIPP schools' growth, supra note 76. 
99. See, e.g., Indiana and New Hampshire (unlimited only if sponsored by local 
school boards); Iowa (one charter per district). 
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local district, many of whose teachers may be opposed to the 
formation of a competing schoo1. 10° Charter caps, according to 
some individuals, are often in place due to the political 
influence of the teachers' unions in traditional public schools. 101 
Teachers' unions arguably oppose charters because "[g]iven 
their self-protective instinct, the teachers unions remain 
staunchly opposed to more charters .... [because charters] are 
not automatically unionized. Further, some embrace merit pay, 
another union bete noire, and charter teachers often work 
longer days than those in the traditional public schools." 102 In 
June 2009, the Boston Globe indicated that Secretary Duncan 
was "no fan of the artificial caps that limit the ability of new 
charter schools to open in urban areas where they are most 
needed." 103 
Whether due to caps or because of some other reason(s), the 
number of charter schools in operation today is insufficient for 
the current demand. As of mid-2009, waiting lists held an 
estimated 365,000 students wanting but unable to be admitted 
to charters. 104 This figure indicates that the charter market 
currently is insufficiently large and in need of expansion. 
Building on the economic principles that provided the 
foundation for the charter competition concept, 105 charters 
currently exist in a market that is "illiquid." 106 When a market 
is illiquid, its participants are unable to recognize an asset's 
true or "intrinsic" value. 107 Before realizing an asset's intrinsic 
100. See, e.g., Scot Lehigh, Op-Ed., A Brave Call for Raisin!{ Charter Caps, BOSTOI'i 
GLOBE, May 29, 2009. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Editorial, Take Caps Off Charter Schools, BOSTON GLOBE. ,Jun. 10. 2009; see 
also Dumicus, supra note 10. 
104. See Blackboard Pulpit, supra note 92. 
105. See CHARTER SCH. ]NST., STATE U:--JJV. OF N.Y., FREqUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIO:--JS ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS, 2.2 (2006), supra note 2. 
106. James Forman, Jr. indicated that charters existed in a "quasi-market." James 
Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emer!{ing Evidence from 
Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. tl:i9, (2007) sec 
also John Krainer & Stephen F. LeRoy, Equilibrium Valuation of Illiquid Aosets 19 J. 
OF ECON. THEORY 223, 223 - 227 (2002) (stating that "immediate completion of 
transactions in illiquid markets either is impossible or is attainable only on 
disadvantageous terms" and also referencing other defmitions of illiquid markets). 
107. See generally Gunnar Myrdal, A Note on ''Accounting Prices" and the Role of 
the Price Mechanism in Planning for Development, 68 SW~<:DISH J. OF Eco:--J. 135, 140 
(1966) (stating that '"[i]ntrinsic value' is ... defined as the price that would equate the 
supply and demand for a particular factor or good, if full 'equilibrium' prevailed. 
Equilibrium presupposes a perfect ... market for that factor or good."). 
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value, participants in illiquid markets often benefit from 
exercising patience and waiting until opportunistic sub-
markets develop. 108 As opposed to these illiquid markets, few, 
if any, stakeholders in urban public education markets get paid 
for patience; rather, maintaining the status quo materially 
impairs them, differentiating the charter market from other 
economic markets. Nonetheless, the number of students 
attending charters theoretically should signal to the market at 
least part of a charter's value relative to other options. But 
because of the charter market's current illiquidity, 
stakeholders receive an inadequate number of signals, which 
hinders stakeholders' ability to ascertain a charter's relative 
value in the greater public education marketplace. Developed 
charter markets would increase the quality of signals sent to 
stakeholders and provide additional information as to a 
charter's intrinsic value. President Obama and Secretary 
Duncan appear to recognize that the good in expanding the 
current charter marketplace. Secretary Duncan explained that 
"the distribution of Race to the Top funds - an incentive grant 
program created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act- will include preference to states that ... agree to lift any 
existing charter school caps.'' 109 The federal government, 
therefore, is providing billions of dollars in financial incentives 
for states to remove charter caps and enlarge the charter 
marketplace. This inducement to expand charter markets 
combined with existing consistent growth in sex-segregated 
charters likely will lead to the formation of additional sex-
segregated charters and generate a variety of legal challenges. 
Ill. TITLE IX AND SEX-SEGREGATED CHARTERS 
Title IX states: "No person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
108. See generally Nils H. Hakansson, An Induced Theory of the Firm Under Risk: 
The Pure Mutual Fund, 5 J. OF FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 178 (1970). 
109. See Jennifer Cohen, Education Secretary Duncan Speaks on the Education 
Agenda, The New America Foundation Ed Money Watch Blog, 
http://www.newamerica.net/blog/ed-money-watch/2009/education-secretary-duncan-
speaks-education-agenda-11948 (last visited May 21, 2009). 
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assistance." 110 Thus, if a school receives funding from any 
federal agency, the school cannot exclude students from any 
educational program or activity based on that student's sex, 
without a safe harbor provision elsewhere in the legislation. 111 
Title IX has not been materially amended since its inception in 
1972. 112 Applying Title IX to sex-segregated charters is 
challenging due to the lack of clarity in the statute's language, 
legislative history, and judicial interpretation. While 
admissions policies that segregate students based on sex at 
non-vocational public schools may ostensibly appear to be 
exempted from Title IX's applicability, 113 at least one federal 
court has indicated that 
The limitation on Title IX's applicability to admissions 
policies of public elementary and secondary schools was added 
to the Senate version of the bill immediately prior to its 
passage. A House Amendment to the Senate version explicitly 
covered the admissions policies of such schools, requiring that 
they convert to coed status within seven years of the bill's 
passage. The conference committee considering these 
provisions adopted the Senate version which according to 
[Indiana] Senator [Birch] Bayh was intended to allow 
continued single sex admissions by existing institutions." 114 
In addition to relying on Senator Bayh, the Garrett court 
stated that regardless of whether Title IX exempted admissions 
denials by non-vocational sex-segregated schools, the statute 
still did not preclude protections of benefits and services based 
on students' sex. 115 Practically speaking, the district court thus 
indicated that schools would not be able to segregate students 
based on sex, regardless of an admissions clause that courts 
can read narrowly. 
To avoid a Garrett-like problem in the future, a provision in 
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). 
111. These exceptions include, for example, religious schools and the YMCA. See 
generally 20 U.S. C. § 1681(a)(3)(2006), 1681(a)(6)(B) (2006). 
112. See amendments to Title IX, Aug. 21, 1974, subsection (a)(4), (a)Ui), and~ (6); 
Oct. 12, 1976, subsection (a)(5), and~~ (6)-(9). 
113. Title IX applies only to admissions policies at "institutions of vocational 
education, professional education, and graduate higher education and to public 
institutions of undergraduate higher education. 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a). As a result, this 
language ostensibly appears to exempt sex-segregated admissions policies at non-
vocational public schools from Title IX's coverage. 
114. Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 n.8 (E. D. Mich. 
1991) (referencing Sen. Rep. 92-604; see also discussion of Garrett, infra Part IV. C. 
115. Id. at 1009. 
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NCLB stated that federal funds may be available to LEAs for 
"innovative assistance programs," including, inter alia, 
"[p]rograms to provide same-gender schools and classrooms 
(consistent with applicable law)." 116 NCLB required the DOE to 
issue guidelines relative to LEAs attempting to receive funding 
for sex-segregated schools and classrooms within 120 days of 
NCLB's passage. 117 The DOE obliged by indicating that it 
"intended to propose amendments" to its regulations 
implementing Title IX. 118 The DOE proposed its amendments 
in 2004, 119 and following a notice and comment period, the 
DOE published its amended regulations to Title IX in 2006. 120 
A federal district court relied on two DOE Office for Civil 
Rights ("OCR") rulings that negated sex-segregated public 
116. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23) (2009) (emphasis added). When NCLB was enacted, 
"applicable law" included the U.S. Constitution, and when Congress passed NCLB, 
"applicable law" included, inter alia, Title IX. The original language proposed for this 
section by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson used a "comparability" standard, rather 
than a "substantial equality" standard. Attorneys at the National Women's Law Center 
("NWLC"), a supporter of sex-segregated schooling, opposed the comparability 
standard, because they believed that it retreated from the "substantial equality" 
standard set forth in United States v_ Virginia ("VMF'), 518 U.S. 515, 554 
(1996)(discussed infra Part II.D.) and Sweat v. Painter, 3:39 U.S. 629, 633 (1950). See 
Rosemary Salamone, The Legality of Single-Sex Education in the United States: 
Sometimes "Equal" Means "Different," in GENDER PoL'Y & PRACT. 65 (Amanda Datnow 
& Lee Hubbard eds. (2002)). Leslie Annexstein, senior counsel for the NWLC, stated 
that using the word '"comparable' would change the legal standard and turn the clock 
back to the time when boys had better schools than girls[,]" because in VMI both the 
district and appeals courts found Virginia's proposed separate all-female academy to be 
"substantially comparable," and thus constitutional. See, e.g., Cindy Richards, Public 
Funds for Experimental Single-Sex Ed~, WOMEN'S ENEWS, June 29, 2000, available at 
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/160/context/archive.; Discussion of 
VMI, infra Part II.D. 
117. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(c) (2009). 
118. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31097, 31098 (proposed May 8, 
2002) (intending that they be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt 106). 
119. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11275, 11277-11279 (proposed 
Mar. 9, 2004) (intending that they be codified at 34 C.F.R pt. 106). 
120. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62529, 62530 (ultimately codified 
at 34 C.F.R pt. 106). The DOE noted that 
Because the scope of the Title IX statute differs from the scope of the Equal 
Protection Clause, these reftulations do not regulate or implement constitutional 
requirements or constitute advice about the U.S. Constitution. Rather, they 
implement Title IX .... Recipients may wish to consult legal counsel regarding 
how the Equal Protection Clause ... may affect any particular single-sex school 
71 Fed Reg. 625:1:3 (emphasis added). 
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schools; 121 however those OCR rulings were issued prior to the 
2006 DOE Regulations. 122 The OCH would likely not arrive at a 
similar interpretation under the 2006 DOE Regulations, 
because they provide that only charters that fail to operate as a 
single-school LEA must give students of the excluded sex a 
"substantially equal single-sex school or coeducational 
school." 123 Single-school LEA sex-segregated charters are, 
therefore, immune from providing a substantially equal 
education to the excluded sex under the 2006 DOE 
Regulations. 
Taking the case of a charter that is not a single-school LEA 
and given the varied characteristics that make charters 
unique, imagining how a sex-segregated charter would be 
substantially equal to a coeducational school in the same LEA 
is challenging. The single-school LEA distinction is particularly 
critical in states that are already charter-capped or where the 
broader LEA provides no other sex-segregated option. Under 
some states' charter-enabling legislation, 124 certain sex-
segregated charters may violate the second safe harbor 
qualification relative to Title IX sex-segregated admissions, 
because the charter-enabling legislation in those states does 
not consider a charter to be a single-school LEA. Instead, these 
charters operate under state law within an existing local school 
district and not as a single district LEA under state law. 125 
Because charter legislation in those states does not consider 
charters to be single district LEAs, these charters are part of 
the greater local district and appear to violate Title IX as 
interpreted by the DOE 2006 Regulations. Further, while the 
DOE altered its Title IX regulations in response to NCLB, Title 
121. Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, at 1010 n. 9 (E. D. Mich. 
1991). 
122. ld. 
123. C.F.R. § 106.34(c)(1)-(2) (2005); "A nonvocational public charter school that is 
a single-school local educational agency under State law may be operated as a single-
sex charter school without regard to the requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section." In determining "substantial equality," for charters that are not their own 
LEA, the DOE will consider "the policies and criteria of admission. the educational 
benefits provided, including the quality, range, and content of curriculum and other 
services and the quality and availability of books, instructional materials, and 
technology, the qualifications of faculty and staff, geographic accessibility, the quality. 
accessibility, and availability of facilities and resources provided to the class. and 
intangible features, such as reputation of faculty." Id. at 106.3(b)(3). 
124. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1; Colorado, supra notes 65-67. 
125. Id. 
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IX required each U.S. government agency that provides 
financial assistance to schools to maintain rules or regulations 
interpreting that agency's application of Title IX. 126 Seizing on 
this inconsistency, a recent federal district court complaint 
noted that a number of U.S. government agencies that grant 
financial assistance to educational service providers never 
modified their existing Title IX regulations, including the 
Department of Health and Human Services 127 (providing head 
start funding) and the Department of Agriculture 12R (providing 
free and reduced schoollunches). 129 
So what does Title IX mean besides confusion for sex-
segregated charters? First, judicial and regulatory 
interpretation to date indicate that charters should probably 
avoid relying on the literal text of Title IX and should not 
assume that their admissions policies will insulate them from 
adhering to Title IX merely because the charter is non-
vocational. Second, sex-segregated charters should understand 
their position as an LEA under state law, and those charters 
that are not single-school LEAs must provide a substantially 
equivalent education to the excluded sex. Third, even if a 
126. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2009). 
127. A.N.A. v. United States, No. :3:08-cv-00004-CRS (W.D. Ky. filed May 19, 
2008). In addition. 45 C.F.R. § 86.::34 generally states that "a recipient shall not provide 
any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on 
the basis of sex, or require or refi.Ise participation therein by any of its students on such 
basis." 
128. Sec 7 C.F.R. § 15a.34, which indicates that "a recipient shall not provide any 
courst• or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on the 
basis of sex, or require or refuse participation therein by any of its students on such 
basis." 
129. Rt•presenting the plaintiffs in A.N.A., the ACLU also identified the 
Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. 
Department of Energy, the U.S. Small Business Administration, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Archives, the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. 
Department of Interior, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National 
Science Foundation, the Corporation for National and Community Service, and the 
U.S. Department of Transportation as not having changed their regulations 
interpreting Title JX. A.N.A. (W.D. Ky.) at ~ 44 (referencing 6 C.F.R. § 17.415; 10 
C.F.R. § 5.415; 10 C.F.R. § 1042.415; 1:3 C.F.R. § 11:3.415; 14 C.F.R. § 1253.415; 18 
C.F.R. § 1317.415; 22 C.F.R. § 146.415; 22 C.F.R. § 229.415; 22 C.F.R. § 3.415; 28 
C.F.R. § 54.415; 29 C.F.R. § :36.415; :31 C.F.R. § 28.415; 32 C.F.R. § 196.415; :36 C.F.R. § 
1211.415: :iS C.F.R. § 2:3.415; 40 C.F.R. § 5.415; 4:3 C.F.R. § 41.415; 44 C.F.R. § 19.415; 
45 C.F.R. § 618.415: 45 C.F.R. § 2555.415; and 49 C.F.R. § 25.415). 
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charter is a single-school LEA, if that school accepts funding 
from federal departments besides the DOE, then that charter 
may still violate other federal agencies' Title IX regulations. 
Moreover, despite the DOE's recent changes to its Title IX 
regulations, Title IX itself has not changed. Consequently, 
given its historical interpretation by courts and agencies, 
material challenges remain for sex-segregated charters to live 
peacefully with Title IX, regardless of recent, and arguably 
immaterial, legislative ("consistent with existing law") and 
regulatory (one agency, the DOE) action. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL UNDERPINNINGS 
When assessing the constitutionality of the government's 
actions, courts use three levels of review, depending upon the 
individual or group affected by the government's acts. First, 
"Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even 
if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their 
grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory 
classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be 
conceived to justify them." 130 Therefore, so long as the 
government's acts are rationally related to some governmental 
interest, courts defer to the governmental action. This 
proposition is commonly known as the "rational basis" test. 
Greater scrutiny exists, however, for cases involving 
fundamental rights or suspect classes, and the second level is 
intermediate scrutiny, which has developed since the early 
1970s to apply to cases in which the government's act classifies 
people based on their sex. 131 Under the intermediate scrutiny 
standard, for the government's sex-based classification to 
survive a constitutional challenge, the government must prove 
a substantial relationship to an important governmental 
interest, and, m educational contexts, the sex-based 
classification requires an "exceedingly persuasive 
justification."132 Third is strict scrutiny, which the court applies 
to cases in which the government makes classifications 
generally based on race or religion. 133 For a government act to 
130. McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs. 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). 
131. See infra note 147. 
132. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan (Hogan), 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982); VMI, 
518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
133. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 4:38 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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pass strict scrutiny, the government's classification must be 
necessary to further a compelling government interest. 134 Less 
than a handful of federal, let alone Supreme Court, cases 
address the issue of sex-segregation in public education, with 
essentially only one Supreme Court case at the K-12 level (and 
that case without written opinion), and two at the post-
secondary level. Because sex-segregated charters receive public 
funding through a legislated school choice program, and 
because such charters trigger a sex-based classification, 
knowledge of the following six cases should prove helpful in 
understanding how a court may craft a standard against which 
to judge a sex-segregated charter. 
A. Vorchheimer 
Vorchheimer u. School District of Philadelphia135 
("Vorchheimer") involved sex-segregated schooling at the K-12 
level. Vorchheimer wound its way through the courts during 
the same time that the Supreme Court was developing its 
intermediate level of review. In the mid-1970s, the public 
schools in Philadelphia had separate high schools for boys and 
girls, with the girls' academy clearly inferior. 136 A girl was 
denied admission to attend the all boys school and sued. In 
1975, the district court stated that "the outcome of this case 
depends on which standard of review is applied," 137 and noted 
the development of a new treatment by the Court of sex-based 
classifications, and "the net effect of which has been to take 
classifications based on sex out of the province of the 'rational 
relationship' standard and to place them in a new and 
unchartered territory, possibly uninhabited by any other 
classification." 13 X The district court knew the difficult position 
in which it found itself, remarking that "[a] lower court faced 
with this line of cases has an uncomfortable feeling, somewhat 
similar to a man playing a shell game who is not absolutely 
sure there is a pea." 139 The district court ultimately applied a 
]:34. Jd. 
1:35. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 400 F. Supp. 326, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1975), 
reu'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 
(1977). 
136. See discussion infra note 145. 
137. Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 334. 
13H. Jd. at 3:35. 
139. Jd. at :H0-341. The cases examined by the district court included Reed v. 
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test that looked to see "whether a 'fair and substantial' 
relationship" existed between sex-segregation and the "School 
Board's legitimate interests," 140 and determined that 
impermissible sex discrimination existed. On appeal, however, 
in March 1976, the third circuit found that the presence "in a 
system otherwise coeducational of a limited number of single-
sex high schools" 141 was permissible, so long as enrollment was 
voluntary and the educational opportunities provided were 
essentially equal. As in the district court case, the third 
circuit's opinion occurred prior to the Court's December 1976 
declaration in Craig v. Boren 142 ("Craig") of an intermediate 
level of scrutiny establishing that classifications by sex "must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to [the] achievement of those 
objectives." 143 Just two months after Craig, in February 1977, 
the Court oddly affirmed the third circuit - by an equally 
divided vote- with no published opinion. 144 The Philadelphia 
policy was revisited in state court several years later, having 
been brought under state law claims, and the state court ruled 
that the schools violated the state constitution and that 
Vorchheimer was based on "incomplete facts and evidence." 145 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (first establishing that sex-based classifications were suhjPct 
to scrutiny), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (197:i), Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S. 
351 (1974), Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636 (1975), and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
140. Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 343. 
141. Vorchheimer, 532 F. 2d at H81. The third circuit indicated that each of the 
cases cited by the district court involved "an actual deprivation or loss of a benefit to a 
female which could not be obtained elsewhere." Id. at HH6. ThP third circuit reasonPd 
that none of those cases concerned a situation in which equal opportunity was extended 
to each sex or in which the restriction applied to both sexes. Significantly, none of those 
cases occurred in an educational setting. I d. at 886. 
142. 129 U.S. 190 (1976). 
143. Id. at 197 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (referencing the majority opinion). 
144. Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. 703. 
145. Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 9 Phila. 556 (1983), af('d on other wounds. 478 
A. 2d 1352 (Pa. Super Ct. 1984). The state trial court indicated that 
the Vorchheimer court was not provided with many relevant available data. or was 
provided with only tentative and incomplete facts and evidence. Specifically. 
incomplete or no evidence was presented as to the following facts: Girls High 
students attend classes at Central High (thus undermining the conclusion that 
"adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools"): Central High 
graduates (who have passed all major subjects above ninth grade) arc> awarded 
Bachelor of Arts degrees, whereas Girls High graduates receive high school 
diplomas; there are 2. 7 times more Ph.D.'s and l.fi times more teachers with 21 
years (or more) of teaching experience at Central High; Central High's campus is 
almost three times larger; Central High's library not only contain,.; 50.000 volumes 
(a fact brought out in Vorchheimer) hut Girls High's library contains almost fifty 
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B. Hogan 
The Court reviewed a public university's sex-segregated 
admissions policy in 1981 when a man was denied admission to 
a state nursing school because of his sex, in Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan 146 ("Hogan"). Justice O'Connor 
wrote the Court's majority opinion and stated that "the party 
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the 
basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an 
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification," and 
that "burden is met only by showing at least that the 
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and 
that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives."' 147 Using that 
test, the Court struck down the public university's sex-
segregated admissions program. The Court also stated that 
"although the State recited a 'benign, compensatory purpose,' it 
failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actual 
purpose underlying the discriminatory classification." 148 In 
Hogan, the state failed to establish the "exceedingly persuasive 
justification" needed to sustain the sex-based classification, and 
the school's admissions policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 149 
percent fewer volumes at 26,:100; the library room and setting at Central High are 
appreciably more aesthetic; Central High has more instructional equipment, 
including a separate computer room; both Central High and Girls High offer 
courses. as well as some dub activities, that are not available at the other; 
additional prerequisites for AP Chemistry and AP Physics are imposed upon Girls 
High students hut not Central High students; Girls High students almost 
invariably score lower than Central High students in testing on the Preliminary 
Scholastic Aptitude Test/National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test, as well as on 
the Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT"); whereas 91.8'Y,, of Central High students are 
accepted into college, four percent less or 87.8% of Girls High students are so 
accepted; Central High students were beneficiaries (at least in 1979) of 1.2 million 
dollars in college scholarships, whereas Girls High students were beneficiaries of 
less than half that sum at one-half million dollars; the option of "contract gym", 
while available to Central High students, is not granted to Girls High students; 
while students attending Central High have been beneficiaries of some $382,145 
over a twelve-year period from the Barnwell Foundation, students at Girls High 
are excluded therefrom, the latter group engaging in annual magazine 
subscription sales to gain funding. 
Newberg, 9 Phila. at 564-566 (citations omitted). 
146. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
147. Ho{;an, 4.~8 U.S. at 724 (citations omitted) (referencing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 
450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981), Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979), and 
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
148. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 7:30. 
149. Id. at 7.'31. 
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C. Garrett 
Ten years following Hogan, Detroit attempted to establish a 
number of all-male Afrocentric K-12 schools "in response to the 
crisis facing African-American males manifested by high 
homicide, unemployment, and drop-out rates." 150 Applying the 
second prong of the Court's Hogan test, the Garrett court found 
"no evidence that the educational system is failing urban males 
because females attend schools with males. In fact, the 
educational system is also failing females." 151 While the Garrett 
court stated that attempting to help urban male students 
constituted an important governmental objective, no evidence 
existed that "the presence of girls in the classroom bears a 
substantial relationship to the difficulties facing urban 
males." 152 Because Garrett was a district court opinion, it may 
be instructive, but the decision is binding only in the eastern 
district of Michigan. 
D. VMI 
The most recent guidance from the Supreme Court relative 
to sex-segregated admissions policies by government schools 
occurred in 1996's VMI153 decision. In a majority opinion 
written by Justice Ginsburg, 154 the VMI court stated that it 
will take a "strong presumption that gender classifications are 
invalid" 155 and quoted Hogan, reiterating that "[p]arties who 
seek to defend gender based government action must 
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification"' 156 for 
that action. Further, the government's justification must "be 
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to 
litigation," 157 and "must not rely on overbroad generalizations 
150. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007. 
151. !d. at 1008. 
152. !d. at 1007. 
153. VMI, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
154. Prior to becoming a member of the Court, Justice Ginsburg founded the 
ACLU's Women's Rights Project. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: 'l'RIIlUTE: THE 
LEGACY OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG & THE WRP STAFF (2006), 
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/24412pub20060307.html (last visited Aug. :i, 
2009). The ACLU's Women's Rights Project filed the complaint challenging a sex· 
segregated Kentucky public school in A.N.A. supra notes 127, 129. 
155. VMI, 518 U.S. at 532 (quoting concurrence of Kennedy, J., in .J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex. rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994). 
156. !d. at 524 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). 
157. !d. at 533 (citations omitted). 
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about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males 
and females." 158 Even if the government's objectives are 
genuine, however, the Court did "not question the 
Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse 
educational opportunities. We address specifically and only an 
educational opportunity recognized by the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals as 'unique.'" 159 A constitutionally 
consistent solution, however, can include offering the excluded 
sex a comparable alternative. 160 While Justice Scalia dissented 
that "[t]he rationale of today's decision is sweeping .... [and] 
ensures that single-sex education is functionally dead," his 
prediction appears to have been incorrect, as evidenced by the 
exponential growth in sex-segregated public schools across the 
U.S. in the past decade. 161 
E. Zelman - School Choice 
Recognizing that two distinct constitutional analyses are 
involved when comparing claims of governmental classes based 
on sex and race or religion, 162 the Court's majority in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris 163 ("Zelman") nonetheless merits discussion 
for two reasons. First, it is a relatively recent decision by the 
Court involving K-12 education. Second, it involved the flow of 
15H. ld. 
159. ld. at 534 n.7 (citations omitted). 
160. ld. at 529 (citing U.S. v. Va., 44 F.:id 1229, 1241 (41h Cir. 1995)) (Phillips, J. 
dissenting). Tht> comparability standard and other potential solutions offered by the 
VMI court are discussed in Part V.A-B, infra. See also the VMI majority's discussion of 
"substantial equality" as a part of the comparability test, infra notes 219, 232. 
161. According to NASSPE, the number of public schools offering single-sex 
classrooms in the U.S. rose from 11 in 2002 to over 400 in 200H. Nat'! Assoc. for Single 
Sex Pub. Educ., Schools with Single-Sex Classrooms, 
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-schools.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
162. Precedent exists for segregated schools to pass strict scrutiny. See Hunter v. 
Regents ("Hunter"), 190 F.3d 106 (1999), cert. denied 69 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S. Oct. 2, 
2000). In Hunter, when a student was denied admission to a public elementary school 
because of her race, her parents sued. However, the school was conducted as a research 
lab by UCLA's Graduate School of Education, and because of the elementary school's 
mission was to research and develop effective techniques for use in urban public 
schools. the use of race in the school's admissions process survived strict scrutiny. The 
court indicated that the state had a compelling interest in providing effective education 
to a diverse population, the use of race in admissions was narrowly tailored to produce 
research results that could he used to improve education in the state, and the school 
did not admit students solely on the hasis of a single race; the researchers achieved a 
desired diverse population. But see Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701 (2007), discussed in Part IV.F, infra. 
163. Zelman v. Simons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (5-4 decision). 
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taxpayer funds that were directed to schools - including sex-
segregated private schools 164 - based on the number of 
students exercising an option to attend that school under a 
school choice program. Ohio was sued over its voucher 
program, which allowed financially qualified students (relative 
to the poverty line) 165 to obtain a check or voucher from 
taxpayer funds from the state. The voucher recipient could 
then endorse the voucher to any approved school, public or 
private, 166 and attend the private school. 167 In a decision in 
which six separate opinions were published, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion holding that Ohio's 
voucher program did not violate the establishment clause. 168 
A recent argument asserted that charters may survive 
strict scrutiny and discriminate based on religion, due to the 
Court's "private-choice" doctrine. 169 This argument asserted, 
first, because charters are a creation of school choice, and 
individual choices are a condition precedent to any funds 
flowing to the schools, charters do not sufficiently entangle the 
school and government. 170 The argument next stated that the 
requirement of an intermediate step (i.e., the presentation of a 
check by a parent, rather than by the government, to a sex-
segregated or religious school) in the flow of funding may be 
viewed as immaterial, and direct funding (charters) and 
indirect funding (voucher schools) is a distinction without a 
164. See, e.g., EDCHOICE PARTICIPATING PRIVATE SCHOOLS, OH. 0EP'T OF EDUC. 6 
(2009) (including St. Xavier, an all-boys Jesuit high school in Cincinnati, Ohio, Seton 
High School, an all-girls Catholic school, also in Cincinnati). St. Xavier Admissions, 
http://www.stxavier.org/page.cfm?p=4 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) ("Young men from 
more than 100 grade schools throughout Greater Cincinnati come to St. X's 110-acre 
campus and leave to populate the world as men with a genuine sense of homE~ and 
belonging."); Seton High School, History of Seton, bttp://www.setoncincinnati.org/ 
about/history/ ("Seton has maintained a strong commitment to academic excellence by 
offering a comprehensive curriculum to the young women of Western Cincinnati"). 
165. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3313.978(A) (Anderson 2006). 
166. Id. § 3313.976. 
167. Assuming the student met the certain other admissions requirements of the 
school. 
168. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (5-4 decision). 
169. Note, Church, Choice, and Charters: A New Wrinkle for Public Education?, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (2009). 
170. ld. at 1759-62, 1768-69. The Zelman majority stated that "'no reasonable 
observer' would interpret the indirect flow of funds from the government to religious 
institutions via a series of individual choices as 'carr[ying] with it the imprimatur of 
government endorsement."' ld. at 1761, 1768-79 (quoting Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655) 
(citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 817-18 (2000) (plurality opinion)). 
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difference. 171 Thus, this argument concluded that because the 
funding mechanism of charters is sufficiently similar to 
voucher schools, charters may be equally insulated from being 
viewed as having the government's imprimatur. 
But that argument is incomplete and misleading. The 
Zelman majority explicitly articulated its school choice funding 
rationale when it said that "[t]he incidental advancement of a 
religious mission, or the perceived [government] endorsement 
of a religious message, is [constitutionally permissible when it 
is] reasonably attributable to the individual [funding] recipient, 
not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of 
benefits." 172 The government's role does not end with the 
disbursement of benefits to charters. Instead, when the 
government disburses funds to charters, its role is "just getting 
warmed up," as actor Al Pacino memorably barked in a movie 
concerning a sex-segregated high school. 173 With charters, the 
government authorizes, re-authorizes, oversees, and is 
empowered to shutter every aspect of the very schools to which 
it distributes the funds. The entirety of the charter's 
operation-every computer or desk purchased, every teacher's, 
counselor's, principal's, nurse's, aide's, and janitor's 
employment and compensation can be funded entirely by the 
government. 174 Nearly every action of these employees-
whether in a class, hallway, club, sport, dance, or other 
activity-has the direct imprimatur of the state, as does every 
curricular choice or pedagogical method that the charter uses. 
Countless of these acts, whether tortuous or otherwise, could 
171. The argument asserted that "a plurality in Mitchell v. Helms expressly 
disclaimed the significance of an intermediate step in the flow of funding from 
government to religious schools, finding that respondents' reliance on a 'direct/indirect 
distinction to require that any aid be literally placed in the hands of schoolchildren 
rather than given directly to the school for teaching those same children' was an 
exercise in empty formalism, which 'breaks down in the application to real-world 
programs."' Church, Choice, and Charters, supra note 169 at 1768-69. 
172. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added). 
178. Pacino won an Academy Award as best male actor in a leading role for his 
performance in SCENT OF A WOMAN (Universal Pictures 1992), http://www.imdb.com/ 
name/nm0000199/awards (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
174. A number of charters receive some degree of private support from charitable 
foundations and individuals, but that support is a supplement to the state funding 
needed for operation and does not constitute anywhere near a majority of a charter's 
funding. See, e.g., MATCH Charter Public High School, Donate, 
http://www.match,;chool.org/getinvolved/donate.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
Therefore, public funds may, but do not have to, fund a charter's operations in their 
entirety. 
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result in legal action against the state. The same simply cannot 
be said about private schools that accept voucher funds. 
Only a small portion of the operations of a private school 
that accepts vouchers will be financed by funds coming from 
the state. In Zelman, the choice to use the publicly funded 
vouchers was granted to a limited number of students who 
were (a) in failing districts and (b) demonstrating financial 
need relative to the poverty line. And unless some perverse 
version of Lake Woebegone exists where all of an area's 
children are in failing schools and showing a below average 
financial position, unlike voucher choice, all students 175 in a 
given area are eligible to attempt to enroll in a charter. Private 
schools that receive public funds via vouchers have only a 
single connection to the state - receipt of a modest amount of 
public funds; charters are intertwined with the government 
continuously. Although the private choice cases indeed involved 
school choice and public funds within K-12 education, charters 
cannot be considered anything but public schools; as a result, 
the private choice cases are irrelevant to further discussion and 
analysis. 
F. Parents Involved- Segregation 
Lastly, the 2007 racial segregation case of Parents Involved 
v. Seattle School District No. 1176 is also instructive, because 
the VMI court indicated that the Court's prior opinions in 
racial segregation cases could be used as a basis for analyzing 
sex-segregation cases. The VMI majority ruled that Virginia 
failed to provide females with a "substantially equal" education 
that was "in line with [the Court's holding in] Sweatt [v. 
Painter]." 177 In Sweatt, Texas created two racially segregated 
law schools because the state did not want to admit students of 
color to its all-white University of Texas Law School. The VMI 
court applied the Court's racial segregation analysis in the 
context of the sex-segregation case before it. The VMI majority 
stated that "the [Sweatt] Court emphasized [that more 
important than tangible features], are 'those qualities which 
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for 
175. Excluding those students who are rejected because of a sex-segregated 
admissions policy. 
176. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
177. VMI. 518 U.S. at 554 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, ::Ja9 U.S. 629, 6:1::3 (1950)). 
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greatness' in a school, including 'reputation of the faculty, 
experience of the administration, position and influence of the 
alumni, standing in the community, traditions and 
prestige."' 178 Whether based on race or sex, the VMI majority 
would therefore apply these same factors of equality to both 
types of segregation. Because (1) the VMI majority had 
indicated that its rationales in racial segregation cases such as 
Sweatt were applicable to sex-segregation cases such as VMI, 
(2) Parents Involved dealt with segregation in K-12 public 
education, and (3) Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority 
opinion (giving insight as to how both he and Justice Alita as 
two of the newer members of the Court approach segregation 
issues), Parents Involved may help to provide an analytic for 
approaching sex-segregated charters. 179 Just as using sex-
segregated admissions policies involve the binary of male and 
female, in Parents Involved, Seattle's public schools used only 
the binary white/non-white racial classifications as a tie-
breaker to assign students to various high schools. 180 The 
Parents Involved majority rejected Seattle's binary racial 
segregation plan as unconstitutional, quoting from Brown: 
"'The impact [of segregation] is greater when it has the 
sanction of law.'"181 In striking down Seattle's public school 
binary segregation plan, the Parents Involved majority stated 
that 
race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve 
"exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and 
viewpoints[;]" race, for some students, is determinative 
standing alone. The districts argue that other factors, such as 
student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their 
plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is 
decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with 
others in reaching a decision ... the plans here "do not provide 
for a meaningful individualized review of applicants" but 
178. ld. at 554 (citing Sweatt. 339 U.S. at 634). 
179. Having said that, because as in Zelman, the Justices published six opinions in 
Parents Involved, its instructive value is complex and arguably tenuous. 
180. Parents Involved at 724 (stating that "under the Seattle plan, a school with 50 
percent Asian-American students and 50 percent white students but no African-
American, Native-American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced, while a 
school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent 
Latino, and 20 percent white students would not."). 
181. /d. at 746 (quoting Brown v. Ed. of Educ. at 494) (citations omitted) (brackets 
in original). 
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instead rely on racial classifications in a "nonindividualized. 
mechanical" way. 1x2 
At the end of the majority opinion, Chief ,Justice Roberts 
wrote succinctly: "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis 
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 1X3 
Assuming that the Court continues to extrapolate its rationale 
from public school racial segregation cases to public school sex-
segregation cases as it did in VMI, and given that some 
charters segregate students based on a binary, as in Parents 
Involved, because sex-segregated charters' admissions policies 
rely on classifications in a "nonindividualized, mechanical" 
way, 184 these charters' policies beg for equal protection clause 
challenges. 
V. THE COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE TESTS APPLIED TO 
A NEW YORK SEX-SEGREGATED CHARTER 
Because a charter is a public school, it is a state actor 
subject to equal protection clause challenges. In matters 
involving public education, the Court historically has deferred 
to the states. 185 This judicial deference that benefits charters in 
general, however, shifts to a "skeptical scrutiny" 186 when public 
schools apply sex-based classifications. Therefore, a state actor 
must produce an exceedingly persuasive justification to 
182. !d. at 723 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
183. !d. at 748. 
184. Id. at 723. 
185. The Supreme Court has stated: (1) "education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments," (Brown v. Ed. of Educ. of Topeka. :i47 U.S. 
483, 493 (1954)); (2) "[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of 
a State," Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 21.3 (1972); (3) courts "lack ... experience" 
that "counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at 
the state and local levels," San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 
(1973); (4) "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools .... " Millikin v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974); 
(5) "[t]he very comp]P.xity of the problems of ... managing a statewide public school 
system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method 
of solving them,' and that, within the limits of rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to 
tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect," San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 
U.S. at 42 (1973) (quoting ,Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-547 (1972)); and (6) 
public schools are "'a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic 
system of government,"' Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Sch. Dist. of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, ,J., concurring)). 
Such deference by the Court is a strong positive signal for continued charter expansion 
and general innovation. 
186. VMI, 518 U.S. at 531. 
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maintain the sex-segregated education. Reviewing the 
constitutionality of all sex-segregated charters is beyond the 
scope of this Article's analysis. New York, nonetheless, serves 
as a compelling study of sex-segregated charters because the 
state (a) legislatively authorized the creation of sex-segregated 
charters, (b) currently has sex-segregated charters in 
operation, and (c) has articulated transparently its important 
government objectives in authorizing these charters and how it 
believes its sex-segregated policies are substantially related to 
those objectives. As a result, New York presents strong policy 
and legislative arguments alongside transparent decision-
making in favor of sex-segregated charters that can be 
analyzed under the equal protection clause. 
A. Background on University Prep and the General Equal 
Protection Test 
In June 2009, New York approved a sex-segregated charter 
to operate in the city of Rochester. The state approved the 
University Preparatory Charter School for Young Men 
("University Prep"), and the school is scheduled to open in 
September 2010. 187 Structurally, University Prep anticipates 
providing an extended school day and year[,] ... daily time 
for individualized learning support called QuadE 
(enrichment, enhancement, expansion or exploration)[,] ... 
daily time for guided study to allow students to obtain 
homework support, study groups, and academic support 
services[,] . . . a mentor from the community for each 
student[,] ... and daily advisory or crew time to allow for 
consistent support and guidance among a small group of 10-
12 students. 188 
Similar to Boston's nationally ranked MATCH Charter 
Public High School, 189 University Prep "plans to hold a summer 
institute each year to orient new students." 190 Moreover, the 
187. CHARTER SCHOOLS INSTITUTE, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS, APPLICATION TO ESTABLISH THE 
UNIVERSITY PltEPARATORY CHARTER SCHOOL FOR YOUNG MEN 5 (Jun. 12, 
2009)[hereinafter UPREP SUMMARY]. 
188. UPREP SUMMARY at 2. 
189. See The Top of the Class: The Complete List of the 1,500 Top U.S. High 
Schools, Newsweek Web Exclusive, June 8, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201160 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2009) (ranking MATCH 85th in the U.S. for 2009).; see also 
discussion of MATCH, supra note 55. 
190. UPREP SUMMARY, at 2. 
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school intends to establish partners with local colleges, 
including "SUNY Geneseo, Nazareth College, St. John Fisher 
College, Monroe Community College and Bryant and Stratton 
College." 191 In terms of stakeholder buy-in, University Prep's 
mission is "for its students to master higher order thinking 
skills, productive life skills and to develop the quest for 
learning needed to graduate from high school, succeed in 
higher education, and to be successful in the work place." 192 "To 
achieve its mission," University Prep anticipates 
"implement[ing] a specific curriculum known as Experiential 
Learning Outward Bound .... "193 ("ELOB"). ELOB uses an 
"active pedagogy" that "engage[s] students using ELOB 
structures that encourage rigor, collaboration, leadership 
skills, and character building. . . . [and] utilizes learning 
expeditions that cross disciplines to engage students in real 
world applications of required curriculum content." 194 
Because the charter admits only males a presumption 
exists against University Prep's constitutionality. 195 This 
presumption can be rebutted, however, if the government 
shows an "exceedingly persuasive, genuine" justification for the 
segregation that does not rely on overbroad generalizations 
about the different capacities of the sexes, "serves 'important 
governmental objectives and . . . the discriminatory means 
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives,'"196 or if the government offers a comparable 
alternative to the excluded sex. 197 Enrollment must be 
voluntary, and comparable options such as courses, services, 
and facilities must be available to students of both sexes. 
In approving University Prep's charter application, New 
York stated that "the school's goal of promoting equal 
educational opportunity for males that are not receiving the 
benefits of public education in Rochester in proportion to 
females ... serves an important governmental objective." 198 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 1. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 531. 
196. See Id. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197. Id. at 531. 
198. UPREP SUMMARY, at 5. 
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New York's important government objectives included 
promoting "public school diversity and choice" and serving the 
area's needs of male students with documented difficulties in 
the traditional public schools. 199 New York indicated that the 
sex-segregated admissions policy was substantially related to 
those objectives, and "not based on invidious discrimination 
against females."200 
Since the Court's last guidance on sex-segregation in VMI, 
NCLB's mandate for the DOE to revisit legally consistent sex-
segregated education,201 the 2006 DOE Regulations, and New 
York's authorization of sex-segregated charters constitute 
arguably meaningful federal and state justifications in favor of 
sex-segregated charters. But meaningful does not equal 
"exceedingly persuasive," and beyond providing these broad 
justifications, the University Prep charter approval also 
articulated specific policy reasons for allowing University Prep 
to be sex-segregated. The application's approval was based on 
"numerous studies and experts that support single sex 
education, including Lee, Byrk, Marks, Mael, and Riordan. 
These researchers confirm that single-sex schools improve 
student achieuement."202 However, many of the authors on 
which New York relied to confirm its conclusion failed to 
control for meaningful variables in their studies, are outdated, 
have indicated that any benefits associated with sex-segregated 
schooling are inconclusive, and have been improperly used by 
proponents of sex-segregated education. 
For example, Nancy Levit conducted an exhaustive policy 
analysis that concluded, "the studies [including Lee, Byrk, 
Marks, and Riordan] show no consistent advantages in 
educational quality in single-sex schools, once confounding 
variables are controlled."203 Levit further stated that "Lee and 
Byrk did not control for 'possible preexisting differences in 
academic achievement, prior course work, self-concept, locus of 
control or other school-related behaviors and attitudes that 
were considered as outcomes.'"204 Moreover, Lee and Marks 
199. !d. 
200. ld. 
201. See Part III, supra. 
202. UPJ{EP SUMMAHY, at 1 (emphasis added). 
203. Levit, supra note 1 at 521. 
204. !d. at 487 (citing Herbert W. Marsh, Effects of Attending Single-Sex and 
Coeducational High Schools on Achievement, Attitudes, Behaviors, and Sex Differences, 
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demonstrated that boys who attended sex-segregated high 
schools experienced "no statistically significant effects, either 
positive or negative, on college attitudes and values,'>205 and 
graduates of all boys schools were "less likely to show concerns 
for social justice" and were "less satisfied with the nonacademic 
aspects of their colleges .... "206 While Fred Mael indicated in 
1998 that sex-segregated schooling may provide "academic and 
attitudinal benefits for at least some students,"207 his more 
contemporary 2005 research prepared for the DOE concluded: 
"For many outcomes, there is no evidence of either benefit or 
harm."208 
Peeling back the layers, the three overarching reasons 
behind charter success appear to cause student improvement in 
sex-segregated schools, not the sex-segregation per se. For 
example, Lee not only "credited the organizational and 
administrative characteristics common in single-sex Catholic 
schools for their 'success"'209 but also believed that "separating 
adolescents by gender for secondary schooling is not an 
appropriate solution ... in educational outcomes, either in the 
short or the long run."210 Providence College Sociology 
Professor Cornelius Riordan's 1999 research stated: 
single gender schools work ... for girls and boys, women and 
men, whites and nonwhites, but this effect is limited to 
disadvantaged students. Research has demonstrated that the 
effects of single-gender schools are greatest among students 
who have been disadvantaged historically - disadvantaged 
minorities, low and working class youth . . . . Furthermore, 
these significant effects for at-risk students are small in 
81 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 70, 72 (1989)). 
205. Valerie E. Lee & Helen M. Marks, Sustained Effects of the Single-Sex 
Secondary School Experience on Attitudes, Behaviors, and Values in College, 82 J. 
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 578, 585 (1990). 
206. Id. at 586. 
207. Fred A. Mae!, Single-Sex and Coeducational Schooling: Relationships to 
Socioemotional and Academic Development, 68 REV. EDUC. RES. 101, 101 (1998). 
208. FRED MAEL ET AL. SINGLE-SEX VERSUS COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING: A 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW, AT X (POL'Y & PROG. STUD. SVC. 2005). This study included "'an 
exhaustive search" that began with a review of 2,221 studies. Id. 
209. Levitt, supra note 1 at 505 n. 395. In addition, Lee stated that she '"found 
positive effects from single-sex education 'only in Catholic schools.' The findings there 
were consistent: positive effects for girls but no difference for boys." Id. at 487 (citing 
Valerie E. Lee, Is Single-Sex Secondary Schooling a Solution to the Problem of Gender 
Inequity, in AlviERICAN Ass'N UNIV. WOMEN EDUC:. FOUND., SEPAHATED BY SEX: A 
CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX EDUC. FOH GIRLS, 41, 43 (1998)). 
210. Lee, supra note 209, at 46. 
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comparison with thr much larger effects of home background 
and type of curriculum in a given school. 211 
The pro-academic choice made by parents and students is the 
key explanatory variable .... [I]f you could produce this result 
without [sexJ exclusion, that would be preferable but it is not 
possible in American society or schools at this time." 
349 
That time was ten years ago, only a few years into the 
charter movement and too early to study how charters, rather 
than sex-segregated schooling, affected Riordan's key variable 
of choice. Assuming arguendo that Riordan's research was 
correct that choice is the key variable to greater academic 
success in sex-segregated environments for historically 
disadvantaged urban youth, then the argument for sex-
segregated charters is even weaker today. Again, in 1999, 
Riordan noted: 
This academic environment is a function of the choicemaking 
process that is made by students who attend single-gender 
schools. In this regard, it is entirely different from a set of 
structures or programs that are put into place by educators. In 
single-sex schools, the academic environment is normative in 
a true sociological sense. It is a set of rules established by the 
subjective reality . . . of participants, which takes on an 
objective reality as a set of structural norms .... 
[A]alternatives . . . for creating a pro-academic 
environment . . . in schools generally should be considered. 
Specifically, examine the organizational features of effective 
schools.212 
By taking a system that permits for choicemaking and 
coupling it with an examination (and presumably replication) 
of successful organizational characteristics, and adding a 
normative environment (i.e., stakeholder buy-in), charters ipso 
facto negate any exceedingly persuasive justification for sex-
segregated education. 
More contemporary studies also support this conclusion. In 
211. Comment. Cornelius Riordan, in Single-Sex Schooling: Law, Policy, and 
Research, 2 BI\OOKINGS lNST. PAPERS ON EDUC. POL. 231, 283-84 (1999) (emphasis 
added). Riordan's research included solely sex-segregated schools, not sex-segregated 
classrooms. as he believed that "an academic culture that is endemic to single-sex 
schools ... cannot be produced in one or two classrooms within an otherwise 
coeducational school." !d. at 28:3, 285. 
212. !d. at 285-86 (emphasis added). 
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2005, Lee Hubbard and Amanda Datnow examined California's 
sex-segregated public school pilot program and stated that 
"these schools' successes were due more to the interrelated 
contributions of the schools' organizational characteristics, 
positive student-teacher relationships, and ample resources."213 
Again, organizational architecture, choice, and buy-in - the 
very components creating charter success - are what support 
improved urban public education, not sex-segregation.214 
Moreover, a study published in late 2008 led by Professor 
Riordan similarly confirmed that the results of sex-segregated 
schooling were mixed.215 Another study published in 2009 
stated that sex-segregated education led to "limited benefits," 
and the results of the study did "not provide a ringing 
endorsement of single-sex education."216 Nonetheless, the sole 
area in which that study found that sex-segregated schooling 
"may. . . provide an important opportunity to continued 
improvements in educational quality" was for black males and 
low income students, who "experience unique gains" in sex-
segregated classes. 217 While the evidence on sex-segregated 
schooling IS inconclusive, even assummg arguendo that 
213. Lea Hubbard & Amanda Datnow, Do Single-Sex Schools Improve the 
Education of Low-Income and Minority Students? An Investigation of California:~ 
Public Single-Gender Academies, :~6 ANTHROP. & EDUC. Q. llfi, 115 (2005). 
214. See also Deborah L. Rhode, Single-Sex Schools Can Only Be Way Stations, 
1997 NAT'L L.J. A19 (stating that "[c]oeducational classrooms that use teaching 
strategies common in all-female environments have proven equally successful m 
improving girls' math and science."). Moreover, Beth Williger asserted that 
studies indicate that certain components, other than the separation by sex, create 
equitable and effective educational environments: (1) a relatively small student 
body that allows students to develop a sense of personalism and connectedness to 
the group; (2) a strong emphasis on academic content and achievement; (:l) high 
expectations for student achievement; and (4) a shared understanding of and 
commitment to the school's mission and values. 
Beth Willinger, Single Gender Education and the Constitution, 40 LOY. L. REV. 253, 
256 (1994). 
215. RMC RES. CORP. (led by Cornelius Riordan), EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS: PEHCEPTJONS AND CHARAC'l'EHISTICS ix, x 2008 (prepared 
for DOE Office of Planning, Evaluation, & Policy Development) (stating: 
The results of the systematic review are mixed Among the concurrent 
academic accomplishment outcomes. 5:3 percent were null (favored neither single-
sex nor coed schooling). 10 percent had mixed results across sex or grade levels. 35 
percent favored single-sex schooling, and only 2 percent favored coed schooling. 
Among the concurrent socio-emotional outcomes, 39 percent were null, 6 percent 
were mixed, 45 percent favored single-sex schooling, and only 10 percent favored 
coed schooling). 
216. Sherrilyn M. Billger, On Reconstructing School Segregation: The Efficacy and 
Equity of Single-Sex Schooling, 28 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 393, 402 (2009). 
217. Id. (emphasis added). 
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research continued to confirm that "[s]ingle-sex education 
affords ... benefits to at least some students"218-in this case 
black males and low income students-such a justification was 
acknowledged by the VMI court and still did not survive 
constitutional scrutiny. As a result, even if New York had 
important governmental objectives in offering sex-segregated 
charters, the evidence proffered by the state in the University 
Prep charter application did not bear a substantial relationship 
to those important objectives. Because this relationship was 
based on dated and unsupported data that only provides 
hypothesized benefits to some students, the justification for 
University Prep's sex-segregation cannot nse to the 
exceedingly persuasive level required by VMI. 
B. Possible Safe Harbors 
The VMI majority indicated that unique sex-segregated 
education may be constitutionally permissible if comparable 
educational opportunities are provided for the excluded sex.219 
To claim that a traditional public school is comparable to a 
charter is to negate the history, rationale, and basis for 
charters' existence. Telling a student that the traditional public 
school provides a comparable education ignores all three 
prongs of what makes charters unique: choice through 
markets, unique organizational structure, and stakeholder 
buy-in. If traditional public schools were indeed comparable, 
charters would not exist. Nonetheless, New York specifically 
found that comparable facilities and programs existed for 
females in Rochester's traditional public schools.220 The state 
indicated that "comparable facilities and programs" existed for 
females in the traditional Rochester public schools, because 
"the academic program and curriculum" provided to University 
Prep was "founded on the identical . . . New York State 
Learning Standards taught in the Rochester district schools," 
and the ELOB curriculum to be implemented at University 
218. VMI, 518 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added). 
219. "Virginia, in sum, while maintaining VMI for men only, has failed to provide 
any 'comparable single-gender women's institution."' Id. at 553 (citation omitted). In 
framing comparability, the VMI majority looked to Judge Phillips' dissent in the third 
circuit, which included "substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular 
programs, funding, physical plant, administration and support services ... faculty[,] 
and library resources." Id. at 548 (referencing VMI, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
220. UP REP SUMMARY, at 5. 
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Prep was "not a significant departure" from the curriculum at 
the traditional public schools. 221 New York made this assertion 
despite having stated elsewhere in the University Prep 
Summary that the ELOB curriculum was already used by a 
charter in the city of Buffalo, New York, and 
its gth and lOth grade students outperformed all but one of 
Buffalo's non-selective high schools on the state assessments 
in English language arts and mathematics in its first year, 
including high school grades; 90% of its students passed the 
Living Environment Regents exam, and 88% passed the Math 
A exam.222 
According to a recent third-party study, the ELOB 
curriculum showed "highly promising evidence of success"223 
when compared to other curricula used for at-risk students. 
The Rochester City Schools use the ELOB curriculum but only 
in a school that requires students to complete an application 
and screening process,224 and charters do not reqmre 
admissions applications. 225 Moreover, University Prep 
indicated that it intended to establish partnerships with a 
number of specific local colleges that would benefit University 
Prep students. 226 According to the Rochester City School 
District's website, no such collegiate partnerships exist for its 
schools during the academic year, although one school has an 
affiliation with the College Board, and the school offers 
"electives in law and citizenship."227 How does excluding 
females from these opportunities provide them with a 
comparable opportunity in Rochester? Given these material 
benefits of University Prep relative to the traditional public 
schools, it is hard to believe that University Prep does not 
constitute "a significant departure from what is offered in the 
Rochester City Schools" and that "comparable facilities and 
221. ld. 
222. Id. at 1. 
223. GEOFFREY D. BORMAN ET AL. COMPREHENSIVE SCI!. REFORM AND STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT: A META-ANALYSIS. REPORT No. 59 AT 32 (JOHNS HOPKINS UN!V. CTH. 
FOR RES. ON THE EDUC. OF STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK ("CRESPAR"') Nov. 2002). 
224. See Rochester City Schools High School Descriptor, School #58, World of 
Inquiry School, http://www.rcsdkl2.org/school58/highschooldescriptor.html (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2009). 
225. See discussion of charter requirements, Part II.B, supra. 
226. UPREP SUMMARY, at 2. 
227. See Rochester City Schools, 
http://www.rcsdkl2.org/schools/secondary/NWPREP.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2009). 
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programs for females . . . exist in the Rochester City School 
District."228 
Nonetheless, because a number of other charters exist in 
Rochester, including the Urban Choice Charter229 and the 
Rochester Academy Charter School,230 females arguably may 
have comparable educational opportunities. More troubling, 
however, is that part of the stakeholder buy-in with charters is 
not solely about having theoretical choices; a choice among 
other schools that do not fit that stakeholder's wants is hardly 
a choice. A school's organizational structure, including its 
specific curriculum and pedagogy, influence a stakeholder's 
choice and buy-in. For example, if an area had three charters, 
an Afrocentric male school, a coeducational school focused on 
math and science, and an all-girls school focusing on the arts, 
the curricula are so divergent that their comparability would 
be highly questionable. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence 
in VMI stated that "one [school] could be strong in computer 
science, the other could be strong in liberal arts. It would be a 
sufficient remedy, I think, if the two institutions offered the 
same quality of education and were of the same overall 
caliber."231 Even so, as New York illustrated in the University 
Prep application approval, and as a third-party study 
demonstrated, the ELOB curriculum is not of the same overall 
caliber as that used in Rochester's other public schools, and no 
reason exists to think that the ELOB curriculum as 
implemented in Rochester would be anything but similarly 
superior to Rochester's other public schools. As a result, 
Rochester's other public schools do not appear to meet even the 
lower standard of comparability set forth by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, let alone the existing standard of comparability 
articulated by Justice Ginsburg in the VMI majority.232 
Beyond a safe harbor for comparability, the VMI Court also 
indicated that sex-segregated public education may be 
constitutional in other instances. For example, the Court stated 
that sex-based classifications were permissible if used "to 
228. Id. at 5. 
229. UPREI' SUMMARY, at 2. 
2:30. Id. 
2:31. VMI. 518 U.S. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
2:32. As notpd above, the comparability standard discussed by the VMI majority 
was based on the Court's opinion in Sweatt v. Painter, which required "substantial 
equality." 
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compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities they 
have suffered'. . . 'to promote equal employment 
opportunity' ... [and] to advance full development of the talent 
and capacities of our Nation's people."233 Indeed, the Court 
noted that "it is the mission of some single-sex schools 'to 
dissipate, rather than perpetuate, traditional gender 
classifications."'234 None of these reasons, however, were cited 
by New York in the University Prep application, and it is, 
therefore, unlikely that University Prep would satisfy these 
exemptions for permissible sex-segregated public education 
that the Court set forth in VMI. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Relative to the history of traditional public education in the 
United States, the charter movement, as those it seeks to 
educate, remains in its youth. Various studies have 
demonstrated charter success relative to traditional public 
schools. To avoid the failed system of the past and the divisions 
in public education exacerbated by large-scale bureaucratic 
government control, markets should exist in which 
communities of stakeholders can create and innovate with 
public education. Having stakeholders, including students, buy 
into the idea that schools want the stakeholders involved is 
important in erasing many of the tensions and failures that 
have existed and continue to plague the U.S. public education 
system. 235 Because students can learn critical skills through a 
variety of curricula, particularly through curricula that is of 
interest to them, expanded educational markets should 
continue to experiment with charters that offer curricula 
centered around issues of cultural consciousness, social justice, 
math and science, technology, arts, and so many others in 
incubation. Charters are primarily successful because of choice, 
buy-in, and structure. However, the charter market as 
currently constituted is illiquid. Whether due to de facto or de 
jure caps, the charter market's small size hampers those 
attempting to attend charters, and it prevents sufficient signals 
of charters' relative value from being distributed into the 
2:3:3. VMI, .518 U.S. at 583 (citations omitted). 
234. I d. at 534 n. 7. 
235. See Jeff Duncan-Andrade and GASTON ALONSO ET AL., supra note 89. 
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educational marketplace. Spurred by incentives in the No 
Child Left Behind Act and the Department of Education's 
revised Title IX regulations, the number of sex-segregated 
public schools has grown exponentially in the past decade. 
President Obama's administration is working across the 
political spectrum to incentivize additional charter growth, and 
Secretary Duncan has historically supported sex-segregated 
schooling. As a result, the development of even more sex-
segregated charters is likely, and a 2009 sex-segregated charter 
approval by New York provides proof of that development as 
well as a useful study. 
The case law that applies to sex-segregated schools is 
murky. The U.S. Supreme Court has decided only one case that 
classified primary and secondary public school ("K-12") 
students based on sex, and that ruling was made by an equally 
divided Court, without a published opinion. The Supreme 
Court's most recent decision regarding sex-segregated public 
education-at the college level in 1996-left Justice Scalia 
dissenting that sex-segregated schooling was "functionally 
dead." Meanwhile, the Court's most recent pronouncements 
that involved not only K-12 choice schools but also K-12 school 
segregation were 5-4 decisions that contained an unusually 
high six opinions each. Research on sex-segregated public 
schooling is inconclusive. Many studies, including those 
authored by individuals relied on by New York in the 
University Prep approval, suggest that the choice, structure, 
and buy-in of sex-segregated schools is what makes those 
schools successful. And because these three factors constitute 
the hallmarks of charter success, and because the research on 
sex-segregated public schooling is inconclusive, nothing 
exceedingly persuasive currently justifies the existence of sex-
segregated charters. Even if some students may benefit from 
sex-segregated charters, VMI recognized that sex-segregated 
education provided "benefits to at least some students,"236 and 
the Court still struck down VMI's sex-segregation as 
unconstitutional. 
The traditional Rochester schools cannot be considered 
comparable to the University Prep charter, as they are not 
schools of choice, they lack the same buy-in and organizational 
structure-including the specialized curriculum-that 
236. VMI, i118 U.S. at 534. 
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University Prep is implementing that proved to be of a higher 
caliber elsewhere in the state. University Prep did not (and 
likely could not) claim to compensate male students "for 
particular economic disabilities they have suffered,"' "'to 
promote equal employment opportunity,"' or "'to advance full 
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's 
people."'237 Nor did University Prep have as its mission to 
"'dissipate, rather than perpetuate, traditional gender 
classifications."'238 As a result, a legislative desire to maintain 
sex-segregated charters coupled with an application process 
that displays even-handedness by the state with no invidious 
intent still does not meet the high threshold set forth by the 
VMI majority. No matter how well intentioned, the government 
simply cannot do whatever it wants in the name of education. 
Giving the government complete reign over education was 
precisely what caused the need for education reform. The 
benefits of charters appear to be what drive successful non-
traditional public schools, not the claimed benefits of sex-
segregated schooling. Choice, organizational structure, and 
stakeholder buy-in are the real drivers of successful non-
traditional public education, not segregation based on students' 
genitalia. 
Given the material expansion in sex-segregated public 
education, combined with the current existence of sex-
segregated charters across the country, charter innovation 
should be as broad and deep as possible but should not include 
sex-segregation unless it addresses the specific narrowly 
tailored permissible exceptions set forth in VMI. If sex-
segregated charters wish to remain within the purview of both 
Title IX and the constitutional guidance set forth by the Court 
in the above cases, sex-segregated charters should not be 
formed as single-school LEAs, and they should: (1) exist only in 
states whose legislatures are clear in supporting sex-
segregated charters, (2) ensure that a genuinely comparable 
education (i.e., "substantially equal") is offered to the excluded 
sex, (3) advance the full development of the talent and 
capacities of students, and (4) be created to (a)(i) redress past 
discrimination and (ii) dissipate traditional sex classifications, 
(b) compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by 
237. Id. at 533 (citations omitted). 
238. I d. at 534 n. 7. 
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that sex, or (c) promote equal opportunity. Otherwise, sufficient 
room for charter innovation can exist by expanding the size of 
the school marketplace and allowing for meaningful choice 
based on structural factors and student buy-in without 
excluding students from public resources based on the 
students' sex. 
To have any meaningful chance of surviving Title IX and 
equal protection clause challenges, sex-segregated charter 
legislation, applications, and governing documents should 
employ the specific language above that the Court has 
indicated would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Using 
such precise diction in hopes of passing constitutional scrutiny, 
however, would likely force the proponents of sex-segregated 
charters to change the vision and practice of the schools that 
they wish to create, as these reasons neither appear to be the 
objectives of sex-segregated charter founders nor are 
mentioned in the legislative acts authorizing sex-segregated 
charters. Nonetheless, if the sex-segregated charter legislation, 
applications, and approvals worked within this narrow 
language in practice, sex-segregated charters may survive 
constitutional scrutiny; without such wording and its de facto 
implementation, sex-segregated charters appear to violate the 
equal protection clause and Title IX. The optimal course of 
action for stakeholders to take in this still unchartered 
territory may be to apply Chief Justice Roberts' rationale in 
race-based public school segregation239 to sex-segregated 
charters; simply put, perhaps the best way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of sex is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of sex. 
2~i9. See Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
